Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent is Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine by Sterk, Stewart E.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 95
Issue 5 July 2010 Article 7
Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent is
Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine
Stewart E. Sterk
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent is Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 851 (2010)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol95/iss5/7
RETHINKING TRUST LAW REFORM: HOW
PRUDENT IS MODERN PRUDENT
INVESTOR DOCTRINE?
Stewart E. Sterk
During the 1990s, modern portfolio theory provided the theoretical
foundation for significant reforms in trust investment doctrine-reforms
that freed trustees from a legal regime in which they faced potential liability
for making "speculative" investments. The reforms enabled trustees to pur-
sue investment policies that protected beneficiaries against inflation risk.
But the reforms worked too well; they encouraged trustees to invest a higher
percentage of trust assets in equities just in time for a decade that has seen
two precipitous stock market declines.
Although no sensible investment strategy would have avoided losses
during these periods of market turmoil, the doctrinal reforms endorsed in the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Prudent Investor Act
made matters worse. By structuring trust investment doctrine as a regime of
vague standards, both the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uni-
form Prudent Investor Act provided trust beneficiaries with little protection
against agency costs that would lead trustees to invest too heavily in equities.
The current regime would be problematic even if its economic underpin-
nings-modern portfolio theory and, in particular, the efficient capital mar-
kets hypothesis-accurately described economic reality. But market behavior
over the last ten years, combined with recent theoretical work, weaken the
economic underpinnings of the current regime and make the current regime's
bias toward equity investments even more questionable. A legal regime that
replaces the current standard-based system with one that provides trustees
with "safe harbors "for making investment decisions can give trustees more
guidance and simultaneously provide beneficiaries better protection against
excess market risk.
INTRODUCTION .................................................... 852
I. THE REFORM MOVEMENT .................................. 856
A. Background Law .................................... 856
B. Modern Portfolio Theory Arrives ................... 858
1. Risk, Return, and Diversification .................. 858
2. Efficient Capital Markets .......................... 859
C. Trust Law Reform Incorporates Modern Portfolio
T heory ............................................. 861
t Mack Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I would like to thank
Greg Alexander, Joel Dobris, Margaret Lemos, Melanie Leslie, David Levine, and Christo-
pher Webber for their generous and helpful comments on earlier drafts.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
II. REEXAMINING MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AS A BASIS
FOR TRUST INVESTING ................................... 867
A. Riskier Investments Generate Higher Returns ....... 868
1. The Contingency of Risk Aversion .................. 869
2. The Feedback Problem: Does Widespread Acceptance of
Modern Portfolio Theory Undermine Its Premises ? .... 870
B. Diversification Eliminates Concerns About Firm-
Specific Risk ........................................ 872
1. Market Declines Do Not Undermine the Case for
Diversification .................................... 872
2. Diversification Does Not Make Every Investment
Suitable ......................................... 874
C. A Trust Portfolio Optimally Deals with Market Risk
by Adjusting the Percentage of High-Risk, High-
Return Investments ................................. 877
D . Sum m ary ........................................... 878
III. PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE: REEXAMINING
DOCTRINAL IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW LEARNING ABOUT
INVESTMENT PRACTICE ................................... 879
A. Is Trust Investing Different from Individual
Investing? .......................................... 879
B. The Agency-Cost Problem .......................... 880
C. The Restatement (Third) and the UPIA as Responses
to the Agency-Cost Problem ........................ 883
1. The Approach Taken by the Restatement (Third)
and the UPIA .................................... 883
2. Problems with the Approach Taken by Both the
Restatement (Third) and the UPIA .............. 885
a. A Deferential Approach ........................ 886
b. An Evaluative Approach ................... 888
D. An Alternative: The "Safe Harbor" Approach ....... 889
E. The Contract Alternative: Why Worry About Default
R ules? .............................................. 892
F. What If Capital Markets Are Not Efficient? ......... 894
G. Delegating Investment Responsibility ............... 897
1. "Reform" and Its Rationale ........................ 898
2. Analyzing the Delegation Problem .................. 899
CONCLUSION ...................................................... 904
INTRODUCTION
The recent banking crisis has shaken public confidence in invest-
ment strategies that many experts, including academics, have champi-
oned for years. The crisis has spawned calls for new regulation of
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both the banking industry and the securities industry more generally.'
But if the crisis has cast doubt on the wisdom of commonly accepted
investment strategies, that doubt also requires a reevaluation of the
choices faced by another class of professional investor-the trustee-
and of the legal doctrine that regulates trustee behavior.
Modern portfolio theory, which (perhaps unfairly) has
shouldered some of the blame for the broader financial difficulties of
the last two years, has revolutionized trust investing and trust law doc-
trine over the past quarter century. "Prudence" always has been the
touchstone for trustee investment behavior,2 but modern portfolio
theory generated a sea change in the legal system's conception of pru-
dent investing. Before the advent of modern portfolio theory, pru-
dent investing meant conservative investing. For a time, some states
went as far as limiting trust investments to a "legal list" that excluded
all investment in common stocks. 3 Even as states abandoned the legal-
list approach in favor of a "prudent man" or "prudent person" stan-
dard for investments, trustees were not to make "speculative" invest-
ments.4 Furthermore, agency costs plagued this traditional regime. 5
Even if the trustee diversified risk, the trustee bore losses associated
with any individual speculative investment while trust beneficiaries re-
alized any gains from speculative investment.
Over the last two decades, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (Restate-
ment (Third)), the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA), and the Uni-
form Trust Code-all influenced by modern portfolio theory-
reformulated the traditional approach to trust investing byjettisoning
I Sewell Chan, Lax Regulation Cited as Major Reason for Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 2010, at B3.
2 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007) (entitled "General Standard
of Prudent Investment" and requiring investment and management of trust funds "as a
prudent investor would"), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959) (requiring
the trustee to make "only such investments as a prudent man would make of his own prop-
erty"). When the American Law Institute set out to prepare the Restatement (Third) of Trusts,
the drafters started with the prudent investor rule and, in 1992, first promulgated what is
currently section 90 as section 227 (thereby maintaining the section numberings of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts). See generally Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restate-
ments, and Trends in American Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1877, 1918 n.183
(2000) (explaining that the prudent investor rule still retained the numbering of the Re-
statement (Second) of Trusts but would be renumbered in its final version). As preparation of
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts progressed, the drafters renumbered former section 227 as
section 90.
3 See BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN
RULE 12 (1986) (discussing how some state legislatures adopted such an approach and
specified permissible investments). The leading case that took a "legal list" approach, leav-
ing corporate securities off the list, was King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 86-90 (1869).
4 See generally LONGSTRETH, supra note 3, at 5-6 (discussingjudicial antipathy to "spec-
ulative" investments).
5 See generally Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L.
REv. 621 (2004) (discussing agency problems that plague trust law).
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its ban on speculative investing.6 Modern portfolio theory's central
tenet is that the prudent investor should seek to diversify risk, not to
avoid risk altogether. Modem trust law-the Restatement (Third), the
UPIA, and the Uniform Trust Code-has implemented modern port-
folio theory in a number of ways. 7 First, it has eliminated trust law's
prohibition on speculative investments. 8 Second, it has imposed on
trustees a duty to diversify. 9 Third, to ensure that persons with an
understanding of portfolio theory make investment decisions, mod-
ern trust law has abrogated the traditional prohibition on delegating
investment responsibilities and has instead sought to encourage such
delegation. 10
Professors Max Schanzenbach and Robert Sitkoff have demon-
strated that these changes in trust law generated a significant shift in
trust investment practices.' Equities now represent a larger share of
trust portfolios, just as modern portfolio theory suggests they should.
In fact, the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA have been too effective in
eliminating the bias in favor of conservative investments. In the new
regime, trustees can compete for trust business by marketing their
past investment successes while downplaying any investment losses,
thus creating incentives for trustees to make riskier investments even
when those investments may not serve the interests of beneficiaries.
Moreover, the investment community's widespread belief that equities
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e (maintaining that, despite its re-
quirement of caution, speculative investments may play a role in an investment strategy
that complies with the caution requirement).
7 See LONGSTRETH, supra note 3, at 12 (analyzing the positive effect of diversification).
8 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACr § 2 cmt. (1994) (Abrogating Categoric Restric-
tions) ("Subsection 2(e) clarifies that no particular kind of property or type of investment
is inherently imprudent."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e(1) (stating that
speculative investments "are not prohibited" and that "the prudent investor rule, despite its
requirement of caution, does not classify specific investments or courses of action as pru-
dent or imprudent").
9 Both the UPIA and the Restatement (Third) decline to impose a blanket rule requir-
ing diversification in all instances. Thus, the Restatement (Third) provides that "the trustee
has a duty to diversify the investments of the trust unless, under the circumstances, it is
prudent not to do so." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(b). In a comment, the Re-
statement (Third) notes that departures from a diversified portfolio "may be justified by spe-
cial circumstances or opportunities of a particular trust or by peculiar risks facing its
beneficiary families." Id. § 90 cmt. f; see also UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3 cmt. (identi-
fying tax considerations as among the special circumstances justifying a failure to
diversify).
10 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACr § 9; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80(1).
11 Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust Investment
Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation, 50J.L. & ECON. 681, 682 (2007) (concluding in their
study that, after a state adopted the prudent investor rule, stock holdings by trusts in-
creased by 3-10 percent); see also Martin D. Begleiter, Does the Prudent Investor Need the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act-An Empirical Study of Trust Investment Practices, 51 ME. L. REv.
27, 73-75 (1999) (concluding, based on a survey of Iowa trust departments, that after the
adoption of an Iowa statute attempting to liberalize traditional doctrine, more trust depart-
ments adopted the modem theory).
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always outperform fixed-income investments undoubtedly exacer-
bated the shift to equities. 12
This shift to equity investments did not generate tangible benefits
for trust beneficiaries. The 2008-9 stock market decline was dramatic.
But even over a longer time horizon of ten years, equity investments
have performed poorly: both the Dow Jones Industrial Average and
the Standard & Poor's 500 Index (S&P 500) stood at lower levels in
June 2009 than they did ten years earlier. 13 In other words, trust law's
implementation of modern portfolio theory appears to have left many
trust beneficiaries worse off than if trust law had retained traditional
principles of trust investing. This fact suggests that it is time to reas-
sess the recent "revolution" in trust law doctrine.
Other articles ably describe both the premises that led to trust law
reform and the reforms themselves, 14 so this Article starts with only a
brief account of modern portfolio theory and its connection to trust
law reform. Part II then considers the implications of recent events
for modern portfolio theory and concludes that some of the tenets of
modern portfolio theory emerge unscathed from that assessment but
that other tenets do not. In particular, decline in the value of a broad
spectrum of investments does not cast doubt on the wisdom of diversi-
fication; recent market experience, however, does suggest rethinking
the principle that every investment, in the right context, is a prudent
investment. Part III then turns to trust law's implementation of mod-
ern portfolio theory and suggests that here the picture is even more
troublesome. First, although the drafters of the Restatement (Third)
and the UPIA accurately warned that diversification could not elimi-
nate market risk, they inadequately accounted for the agency costs
inherent in the trust relationship. As a result, modern trust law imple-
mented no legal rules to provide trustees with appropriate incentives
to consider market risks. Second, by abrogating the duty not to dele-
gate, modern trust law has reduced the incentive for trustees to make
careful investment decisions, and this reduced incentive undoubtedly
has resulted in uncompensated losses for trust beneficiaries.
When promulgated, the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA were
based on the best available empirical data and academic thought. Per-
12 See infra Part II.A.
13 The DowJones Industrial Average stood at 10,970.80 points on June 30, 1999, and
at 8,447.00 points on June 30, 2009. DowJones Industrial Average Historical Prices, http:/
/finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=ADJI (last visited Mar. 3, 2010) (input respective dates in "Set
Date Range"). On June 30, 1999, the S&P 500 stood at 1372.71 points; on June 30, 2009,
the same index stood at 919.32 points. S&P 500 Historical Prices, http://fi-
nance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=AGSPC (last visited Mar. 3, 2010) (input respective dates in "Set
Date Range").
14 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust
Investing, 81 IowA L. REv. 641, 643 (1996).
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haps coincidentally, the changes to trust law, in the aggregate, effec-
tively reduced the liability of banks-institutions with significant
political power-and other trustees for breaches of the duty of care
with respect to trust investments. But with doctrinal changes, as with
investment decisions, hindsight often is better than foresight. And
the time now has come for changes in trust law doctrine that would
better align the interests of trustees with those of trust beneficiaries,
changes that would also hold trustees more accountable for impru-
dent decisions.
I
THE REFORM MOVEMENT
A. Background Law
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, states em-
braced two different approaches to trust investment.1 5 Some states
followed the rule of King v. Talbot,16 which prohibited trustees from
investing in common stock or any enterprise where the trust property
"is necessarily exposed to the hazard of loss or gain, according to the
success or failure of the enterprise in which it is embarked. 1 7 These
states developed, either by statute or case law, a "legal list" of permissi-
ble trust investments-usually real estate mortgages, government
bonds, and, at times, corporate bonds-in which trustees could invest;
any other investment constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. 18 Courts
that adopted the legal-list approach rejected the obvious argument
that men of prudence often invest their own funds in common stock,
noting that "[i]n their private affairs, [trustees] do, and they lawfully
may, put their principal funds at hazard; in the affairs of a trust they
may not. The very nature of their relation to [the trust] forbids it."19
Other states followed the rule of Harvard College v. Amoly, 20 which
rejected the legal-list approach in favor of the principle that a trustee
must "observe how men of prudence.., manage their own affairs, not
in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition
of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the proba-
ble safety of the capital to be invested."21 This "prudent man" rule,
15 See LONGSTRETH, supra note 3, at 11-12 (discussing states' legal-list and prudent
man approaches to trust investment).
16 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
17 Id. at 88.
18 See LONGSTRETH, supra note 3, at 12 (discussing states' legislative responses to the
varying standards).
19 Talbot, 40 N.Y. at 89. As the court noted, the English rule was even more stringent,
permitting investment only in government debt or real estate mortgages. See id. at 83.
20 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
21 Id. at 461.
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although considerably more permissive than the legal-list approach,
nevertheless excluded investment in "speculative" enterprises. 22
Both of these traditional approaches mandated conservative in-
vestment strategies for trustees-strategies that worked better than
heavy investment in equities during the Great Depression. 23 But these
approaches generated considerable dissatisfaction during the
post-World War II era because equities typically generated higher re-
turns than more traditional trust investments. 24 That dissatisfaction
intensified during the 1960s and 1970s when it became painfully ap-
parent to many trust beneficiaries that conservative, "safe" investments
bore a significant risk of their own-the risk that high inflation rates
would erode the real value of trust principal.25 Equities, by contrast,
provided an inflation hedge not available with real estate mortgages
or government or corporate bonds. 26 Yet, trustees who bore the risk
of liability for investing in "speculative" equities stood to gain little by
departing from traditional strategies. 27
22 Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts appeared to treat as a speculative investment
any investment in stock, unless such investment was in a company "with regular earnings
and paying regular dividends which may reasonably be expected to continue." SeeJeffrey
N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52,
52-53, 61 (1987) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. m (1959)) (cate-
gorizing the prudent man rule as imposing "an unfortunate constraint" on trustees that
discourages trustees from making favorable investments).
23 See Mayo Adams Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary Invest-
ment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 OHIo ST. L.J. 491, 496 (1951) (observing
that at the start of the Great Depression, the "deflationary decline" mainly affected the
value of equities, whereas the value of bonds "tended to hold, even to improve"). Shattuck,
however, notes that even such conservative investments were not invulnerable, as eventu-
ally "there arrived a period of depression so deep that the values of negotiable covenants of
all sorts, secured and unsecured, were themselves grievously affected." Id.
24 Cf id. at 507 (predicting that, because of inflation, trusts would "find dominant
investment in equity participations, as contrasted with mortgages, bonds[,] and notes of
hand," in the latter half of the twentieth century).
25 See Gordon, supra note 22, at 92 n.165 (citing court decisions from the 1960s and
1970s in illustrating judicial flexibility permitting trustees to invest in stocks "despite re-
strictions in the trust instrument limiting investment to fixed income instruments, on the
grounds that inflation was rapidly eroding the real value of the trust estate"). See generally
Joel C. Dobris, Speculations on the Idea of "Speculation" in Trust Investing: An Essay, 39 R.AL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 439, 443-44 (2004) (quoting JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND
TRUSTS 1060-61 (2d ed. 2003)) (noting that many states liberalized trust investment stat-
utes in response to the inflation problem).
26 Benjamin Graham, one of the leading investment thinkers of his time or of any
time, wrote in 1973 that the recent inflation had led many financial authorities to conclude
"that (1) bonds are an inherently undesirable form of investment, and (2) consequently,
common stocks are by their very nature more desirable investments than bonds." BENJA-
MIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 47 (rev. ed. 2003). Graham himself rejected that
conclusion, arguing that an investor could not afford to put all of his funds into either the
bond basket or the stock basket. See id. at 48, 55-56.
27 See Dobris, supra note 25, at 445 (claiming that a sure way to establish trustee liabil-
ity was for the beneficiaries to sue the trustee for speculation).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
B. Modern Portfolio Theory Arrives
1. Risk, Return, and Diversification
At roughly the same time that inflation risk was eroding the real
value of traditional trust investments, academic theory began to chal-
lenge the notion that prudent investing required avoiding all risky in-
vestments. 28 Modern portfolio theory owes its genesis to a 1952 article
by Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection29-an article whose insights ulti-
mately won Markowitz the Nobel Prize in Economics. Markowitz
sought to explain the "observed and sensible" fact that many investors
held diversified portfolios. 30
Markowitz started with the assumption that most investors have
two basic objectives: they seek high returns and want those returns to
be "dependable, stable, [and] not subject to uncertainty. ' '3 1 Due to
investor preference for certainty, high-risk investments must offer
higher expected returns than lower-risk investments. 32 Modern port-
folio theory, however, differentiates among risks. Some risks are firm
specific or industry specific.3 3 A prudent investor need not avoid
these risks; instead, the prudent investor can minimize these risks by
diversifying among firms and industries.3 4
An important implication of Markowitz's work is that if a prudent
investor believes that an individual investment has a sufficiently high
expected return, the investor should include that investment in his or
her portfolio regardless of risk. The investor should not avoid risk
altogether but should reduce risk by investing in other high-expected-
return securities with noncorrelated risks. 35
28 See generally Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952) (introducing the
modem portfolio theory as an alternative investment strategy).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 77.
31 HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVEST-
MENTS 6 (Basil Blackwell ed., 2d ed. 1991) (1959).
32 Cf Langbein, supra note 14, at 647 ("Investors demand to be paid to bear the
greater risk.").
33 These risks are also called unique, unsystematic, residual, or diversifiable risks. See
RICHARD A. BREA v & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 132 & n.12
(3d ed. 1988).
34 See id. at 131-33. Markowitz starts with the assumption that most investors would
want to minimize variance of returns for a given level of expected return and to maximize
expected return for a given level of variance. See Markowitz, supra note 28, at 82. Based on
these assumptions, he concludes that, over a large range of probability beliefs, efficient
portfolios generally will be diversified portfolios. See id. at 89 (concluding that the "E-V
rule" leads to efficient portfolios, almost all of which are diversified).
35 See, e.g., Begleiter, supra note 11, at 35 (discussing reducing risk through investing
in noncorrelated assets, as "no asset is inherently good or bad" or overly speculative and
because even "an asset which is highly volatile and speculative in itself may actually reduce
the risk of the total portfolio").
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At the same time, modern portfolio theory recognizes that not all
risks are diversifiable. As Markowitz himself emphasized, the perform-
ances of individual investments often correlate with each other.36
Other scholars attach the labels "market risk" or "systematic risk" to
risks that investors cannot diversify away. 37 Modern portfolio theory
teaches that in determining the content of an investor's portfolio the
investor must assess the level of market risk he or she is willing or able
to bear.38 The investor then should hold a mixture with two compo-
nents-(1) a diversified portfolio of high-risk, high-expected-return
investments and (2) a risk-free investment-proportioned in accor-
dance with the investor's risk tolerance.3 9
2. Efficient Capital Markets
In his influential article, Markowitz did not assert how one might
determine the expected return of particular investments; indeed, he
expressly reserved judgment on that issue. 40 He emphasized only that
if one could identify investments with a high expected return, diversi-
fication would reduce the systematic risk associated with those
investments. 41
36 Markowitz wrote that
in trying to make variance small it is not enough to invest in many securi-
ties. It is necessary to avoid investing in securities with high covariances
among themselves. We should diversify across industries because firms in
different industries, especially industries with different economic character-
istics, have lower covariances than firms within an industry.
Markowitz, supra note 28, at 89; cf John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds
and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 1, 9 (observing that "the risks of most
stocks are positively correlated").
37 See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 33, at 132 n.13, 156 ("Market risk is the aver-
age covariance of all securities. This is the bedrock risk remaining after diversification has
done its work.").
38 See MARKOWITZ, supra note 31, at 6-7 ("The proper choice among efficient portfo-
lios depends on the willingness and ability of the investor to assume risk. If safety is of
extreme importance, 'likely return' must be sacrificed to decrease uncertainty. If a greater
degree of uncertainty can be borne, a greater level of likely return can be obtained.").
39 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 33, at 159 ("If investors can borrow and lend at the
risk-free rate of interest, then they should always hold a mixture of the risk-free investment
and one particular common stock portfolio."); see also Langbein & Posner, supra note 36, at
12 ("[T]he best method of achieving the desired risk/return combination is to adjust the
proportions in which either relatively risk-free assets are included in the portfolio, or bor-
rowed money is used to increase the portfolio's holdings.").
40 See Markowitz, supra note 28, at 91 (stating that, to use his principle for selection of
securities, one must start with procedures for formulating beliefs about expected return
and variance). Indeed, in his closing paragraph, Markowitz wrote:
In this paper we have considered the second stage in the process of select-
ing a portfolio. This stage starts with the relevant beliefs about the securi-
ties involved and ends with the selection of a portfolio. We have not
considered the first stage: the formation of the relevant beliefs on the basis
of observation.
Id.
41 See id. at 89 (discussing the right way to diversify an investment portfolio).
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By the 1960s, however, economists developed the efficient capital
markets hypothesis (ECMH), which elaborated on the expected re-
turn of particular investments. In an efficient market, "prices provide
accurate signals for resource allocation."42 If capital markets were effi-
cient, prices of securities would reflect accurately the expected risk
and return of those securities.43 But capital markets cannot be effi-
cient if securities prices do not incorporate the best available informa-
tion about those securities. If prices do not incorporate all available
information, investors with less information will channel capital to
firms that are not likely to make optimal use of that capital. 44 More
importantly, from an investment perspective, savvy investors would
find opportunities to invest in underpriced securities and thus would
generate higher returns than the market as a whole.
Economists conducted empirical studies of capital markets
against this accepted theoretical background and concluded that se-
curities prices quickly and fully reflected available information about
those securities. 45 This conclusion, which became known as the
ECMH, has significant implications for investment theory. First, if the
ECMH is correct, no individual investor or firm can develop an invest-
ment strategy that consistently beats the market because the market
price already reflects the information on which the investor acts. 46
Second, if the ECMH is correct, no investment is a bad investment
42 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25J.
Fin. 383, 383 (1970).
43 See id. at 384-88.
44 Cf id. at 388 (discussing investors' access to information). See generally Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549,
554-65 (1984) (describing the importance of the availability of information).
45 See Fama, supra note 42, at 414-16 (discussing prior empirical work and concluding
that "the evidence in support of the efficient markets model is extensive, and (somewhat
uniquely in economics) contradictory evidence is sparse").
46 This statement reflects what Fama labels the "strong form" of the ECMH. Fama
distinguishes among three forms of the ECMH: the weak form, the semistrong form, and
the strong form. Id. at 388. The weak form holds that market prices fully reflect past price
or return history. The semistrong form holds that market prices quickly reflect all publicly
available information. The strong form holds that market prices reflect all information,
even information to which some persons have "monopolistic access." Id. In evaluating the
empirical data, Fama concludes that weak-form tests of the ECMH are "the most volumi-
nous, and . . . the results are strongly in support [of those tests]." Id. at 414. He then
reviews the semistrong-form tests and concludes that they "have also supported the effi-
cient markets hypothesis." Id. at 415. With respect to the strong-form tests, he cites some
contradictory evidence with respect to insiders and specialists on the New York Stock Ex-
change, see id. at 409-10, but concludes that "[ffor the purposes of most investors the
efficient markets model seems a good first (and second) approximation to reality." Id. at
416. For a discussion of the mechanics of information flow that supposedly make the
ECMH work, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 44, at 565-92.
[Vol. 95:851
2010] RETHINKING TRUST LAW REFORM
because the investment's price already factors in the investment's
risk.47
C. Trust Law Reform Incorporates Modern Portfolio Theory
Widespread acceptance of modern portfolio theory led to an in-
evitable question: how can trust law induce trustees to engage in in-
vestment behavior recommended by modern portfolio theory?
Existing doctrine certainly provided the wrong incentives. The legal-
list approach precluded all investment in equities, effectively prevent-
ing trustees from investing in high-expected-return investments. 48
Even the prudent man rule, with its ban on speculation, discouraged
trustees from taking advantage of the insights of modem portfolio
theory.49 Under the prudent man rule, a trustee who invested in a
diversified portfolio including high-risk, high-return investments
risked liability for breach of fiduciary duty.50 The prudent man rule
required the trustee to evaluate prudence one investment at a time.51
Academics embraced the lessons of modern portfolio theory and
sought to integrate those decisions into trust law. 52 Practicing lawyers,
banks, and trust companies, all eager to generate higher returns for
their trust clients, supported the changes. 53 Trust law reformers used
47 See Langbein, supra note 14, at 649 ("[Modem portfolio theory] teaches that the
risk intrinsic to any marketable security is presumptively already discounted into the cur-
rent price of the security.").
48 See supra Part I.A.
49 See id. Because trust settlors can expand the trustee's investment authority with
appropriate language in the trust instrument, the common-law rule did not have as signifi-
cant an impact as it otherwise could have had. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 36, at 5.
50 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959). The trustee also faced liability
if the trustee invested in stocks whose expected return came in the form of increased stock
price rather than dividends paid to investors. The income beneficiaries could then bring
an action against the trustee because the trust investment benefitted remaindermen at the
expense of the income beneficiaries. Section 104 of the Uniform Principal and Income
Act has addressed this problem by permitting the trustee to "adjust between principal and
income to the extent the trustee considers necessary if the trustee invests and manages
trust assets as a prudent investor." UNIV. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 104(a) (1994)
(amended 2000). In light of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, a trustee making
investment decisions need not concern itself with the effect of those decisions on trust
beneficiaries who have potentially divergent interests. See Sitkoff, supra note 5, at 652-54.
51 See, e.g., In re Bank of New York, 323 N.E.2d 700, 703 (N.Y. 1974) ("The fact that
this portfolio showed substantial overall increase in total value during the accounting pe-
riod does not insulate the trustee from responsibility for imprudence with respect to indi-
vidual investments for which it would otherwise be surcharged.").
52 The pioneering article was that of Langbein & Posner, supra note 36. See generally
Gordon, supra note 22, at 56 (examining "doctrines of traditional trust law in light of mod-
ern portfolio theory").
53 Bevis Longstreth was a significant catalyst for doctrinal change. Longstreth, a part-
ner at Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP, surveyed two hundred fiduciaries, including fifty bank
trust departments, on their understanding of the constraints imposed by trust law doctrine.
See LONGSTRETH, supra note 3, at 232. The survey revealed that many fiduciaries believed
that existing doctrine sometimes constrained their investment options. See id. at 247. For a
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two principal vehicles to remake trust investment law: the UPIA and
the Restatement (Third). Subsequently, the Uniform Trust Code incor-
porated the provisions of the UPIA.54
When the American Law Institute (ALI) began the process of
preparing the Restatement (Third), it started with the prudent investor
rule, thus reflecting the relative importance of that topic to trust law-
yers. 55 The ALI approved and published a volume of the Restatement
(Third) on the prudent investor rule in 1992,56 more than ten years
before it published any other volume of the Restatement (Third). Two
years later, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) adopted the UPIA, which explicitly acknowl-
edged the influence of that draft Restatement.57
Modern portfolio theory was at the heart of both reform efforts.
The introductory note to the proposed draft of the Restatement (Third)
on the prudent investor rule catalogued criticisms of the prudent man
rule and observed that "[m]uch but not all of this criticism is found in
writings that have collectively and loosely come to be called modern
portfolio theory. 58 NCCUSL was even more explicit in recognizing
the influence of modern portfolio theory:
The [UPIA] undertakes to update trust investment law in recogni-
tion of the alterations that have occurred in investment practice.
These changes have occurred under the influence of a large and
broadly accepted body of empirical and theoretical knowledge
about the behavior of capital markets, often described as "modern
portfolio theory."59
Thus, the American legal establishment's two leading agents of law
reform-the ALI and NCCUSL-acted to transform trust law to con-
form to modern portfolio theory.
bank lawyer's discussion of the development of trust investment reform and the subse-
quent restrictions posed by the prudent man standard, see Austin Fleming, Prudent Invest-
ments: The Varying Standards of Prudence, 12 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 243 (1977).
54 See UNIF. TRUST CODE art. 8 general cmt. (1994) (amended 2005) ("States enacting
the Uniform Trust Code are encouraged to recodify their version of the Prudent Investor
Act by reenacting it as Article 9 of this Code rather than leaving it elsewhere in their
statutes.").
55 For a discussion of trust investment law and recommended changes to the regime,
see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE (Proposed Final
Draft 1990).
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE (1992).
57 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR Acr prefatory note (1994) ("This Act draws upon the
revised standards for prudent trust investment promulgated by the American Law Institute
in its Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule (1992) ....").
58 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE ch. 7, topic 5, at 2
(Proposed Final Draft 1990).
59 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR AcT prefatory note.
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The transformation involved three significant changes to existing
trust law.60 First, both the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA abrogated
categoric restrictions on trust investments; trustees would no longer
bear liability for investing in "risky" or "speculative" investments.
61
Second, both the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA imposed on trust-
ees an affirmative obligation to diversify trust investments. 62 Third,
because modern portfolio theory requires a financial sophistication
that many trustees-especially family member trustees-do not pos-
sess, both the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA reversed the traditional
rule that prohibited trustees from delegating investment functions.
63
In abrogating categoric restrictions on trust investment, the Re-
statement (Third) and the UPIA go far beyond authorizing investments
in common stock. Both documents make it clear that even the most
risky investment often has a place in a trust portfolio.64 The Restate-
60 In addition to the three changes in doctrinal rules, both the Restatement (Third) and
the UPIA explicitly embrace the principles derived from modern portfolio theory that, in
the language of the UPIA, "[a] trustee's investment and management decisions respecting
individual assets must be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio
as a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives
reasonably suited to the trust." UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(b); see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(a). Although the UPIA codifies this principle, the principle itself
does not provide a liability rule or even a liability standard that would decide many cases.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
61 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 (e) cmt. (Abrogating Categoric Restrictions)
("Subsection 2(e) clarifies that no particular kind of property or type of investment is in-
herently imprudent."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. f ("Specific investments
or techniques are not per se prudent or imprudent.").
62 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3 ("A trustee shall diversify the investments of
the trust unless the trustee reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances,
the purposes of the tmst are better served without diversifying."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 90(b) ("In making and implementing investment decisions, the trustee has a duty
to diversify the investments of the trust unless, under the circumstances, it is prudent not
to do so.").
63 SeeUNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9(a) (1994) ("A trustee may delegate investment
and management functions that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly
delegate under the circumstances."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. j ("In ad-
ministering the trust's investment activities, the trustee has power, and may sometimes
have a duty, to delegate such functions and in such manner as a prudent investor would
delegate under the circumstances.") At the time the ALI adopted the prudent investor
rule, the drafters of the Restatement also approved a tentative black-letter section (later in-
corporated into section 80 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts) explicitly reversing the
nondelegation rule in section 171 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80 & reporter's notes ("The contents of this Section differ signifi-
cantiy from the rules stated in [section 171 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts]."); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 ("The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary
not to delegate to others the doing of acts which the trustee can reasonably be required
personally to perform.").
64 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 cmt. (Abrogating Categoric Restrictions)
("The Act impliedly disavows the emphasis in older law on avoiding 'speculative' or 'risky'
investments. Low levels of risk may be appropriate in some trust settings but inappropriate
in others."). By contrast, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts authorized investment in shares
of stock that paid regular dividends but explicitly prohibited investments in new or untried
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ment (Third) provides that "[t] he riskiness of a specific property, and
thus the propriety of its inclusion in the trust estate, is not judged in
the abstract but in terms of its anticipated effect on the particular
trust's portfolio. '65 The UPIA echoes the judgment that "no particu-
lar kind of property or type of investment is inherently imprudent."66
By eliminating the ban on risky investments, the Restatement (Third)
and the UPIA make it possible for a trustee to invest in accordance
with the teachings of modern portfolio theory. This approach con-
trasts markedly with the prudent man rule, which embraced diversifi-
cation but nevertheless required trustees to evaluate the prudence of
each investment in a diversified portfolio. 67
Although the duty to diversify trust investments is central to both
the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA, courts and commentators had
recognized that duty long before the advent of modern portfolio the-
ory.68 Early common-law doctrine, by contrast, had good reason for
failing to recognize a duty to diversify: if the trustee was not entitled to
invest in equities, there was little reason to take advantage of the risk-
reduction advantages of diversification. 69 But the law started to
change long before the ascension of modern portfolio theory. The
Restatement (Second) of Trusts (Restatement (Second)), promulgated in
1959, recognized a duty to diversify, 70 as did many courts.71 Indeed,
the black letter of the Restatement (Third) hardly differs from the lan-
guage of its predecessor Restatement; both qualify the duty by requir-
enterprises (today's "startups"), in shares of stock on margin mortgages, and in junior
mortgages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmts. f & h.
65 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. f.
66 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 cmt. (Abrogating Categoric Restrictions).
67 For a judicial statement on the traditional approach, see In re Bank of New York,
323 N.E.2d 700, 703 (N.Y. 1974):
The record of any individual investment is not to be viewed exclusively, of
course, as though it were in its own water-tight compartment, since to some
extent individual investment decisions may properly be affected by consid-
erations of the performance of the fund as an entity, as in the instance, for
example, of individual security decisions based in part on considerations of
diversification of the fund or of capital transactions to achieve sound tax
planning for the fund as a whole. The focus of inquiry, however, is none-
theless on the individual security as such and factors relating to the entire
portfolio are to be weighed only along with others in reviewing the pru-
dence of the particular investment decisions.
68 See infta note 71.
69 See supra Part I.A.
70 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 228 (1959) ("[T]he trustee is under a duty
to the beneficiary to distribute the risk of loss by a reasonable diversification of
investments . . ").
71 See, e.g., In re Trust of Mueller, 135 N.W.2d 854, 861-62 (Wis. 1965); Mandel v.
Cemetery Bd., Dep't of Prof'l & Vocational Standards, 8 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344-45 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1960). Nevertheless, other courts held that a fiduciary was not required to diversify.
See, e.g., Estate of Knipp, 414 A.2d 1007, 1009 (Pa. 1980) (holding that the fiduciary did not
act imprudently by retaining Sears Roebuck stock as 71 percent of the trust estate when the
will authorized, but did not mandate, that the trustee retain the stock).
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ing a trustee to diversify "unless, under the circumstances, it is
prudent not to do so."72 But although the language of the duty to
diversify is nearly identical, the importance and scope of the duty is
not. Because the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA, in embracing mod-
ern portfolio theory, permit (and even encourage) investments that
would have been impermissible for trustees to make two decades ear-
lier,73 diversification plays a more critical role in reducing risk to trust
beneficiaries. As a result, comments to the Restatement (Third) suggest
the need for "[b]roadened" and "thorough" diversification, effectively
eliminating all risk other than "market" risk.74
Finally, in reversing the common law's ban on delegation of dis-
cretionary trustee functions, the UPIA and the Restatement (Third) re-
lied upon the "specialized investment skills" a trustee might obtain
from the trustee's agent.75 Traditional trust law required the trustee
to perform all trust duties personally, and trust doctrine expressed
this requirement by providing that a trustee was not entitled to dele-
gate discretionary responsibilities. 76 This duty not to delegate had two
principal components. First, the trustee could not avoid liability by
permitting someone else to perform critical trust responsibilities. 77
Thus, if a trustee delegated investment responsibilities to an invest-
ment advisor with supposedly greater expertise and that advisor em-
bezzled the trust funds, the trustee remained liable to trust
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(b); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 228 (requiring diversification "unless under the circumstances it is prudent not
to do so"). The duty to diversify is not absolute because countervailing considerations may
make diversification imprudent. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3 cmt. (1994) (empha-
sizing that tax considerations and preservation of family businesses may make it imprudent
for a trustee to sell existing assets to acquire a diversified portfolio for the trust).
73 See supra Part I.A.
74 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. g. The comment states that
"[s]ignificant diversification advantages can be achieved with a modest number of well-
selected securities representing different industries and having other differences in their
qualities." Id. Although that standard probably would suffice under the Restatement (Sec-
ond), the drafters of the Restatement (Third) go on to note that "[b]roader diversification,
however, is usually to be preferred in trust investing." Id.
75 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 cmt. (Protecting the Beneficiary Against Un-
reasonable Delegation) (discussing advantages of delegation where the agent has "special-
ized investment skills"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. j ("Active investment
strategies, for example, especially in low-efficiency markets such as real estate and venture
capital, are likely to require the hiring of agents with special skills not possessed by many
trustees, often not even by professional or corporate fiduciaries.").
76 See, e.g., In reWill of Hartzell, 192 N.E.2d 697, 706 (111. App. Ct. 1963) ("Although
purely ministerial powers or duties may be delegated by a trustee, generally a trustee may
not delegate powers and duties involving an exercise ofjudgment and discretion.").
77 See, e.g., id. at 709-10 (explaining that the trustee was liable for loss due to an
attorney's misappropriation where the trustee delegated to the attorney the obligation to
obtain and maintain possession of the trust property).
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beneficiaries for the resulting loss. 78 Second, the trustee was not per-
mitted to use trust funds to pay a third party for performing responsi-
bilities encompassed within the trustee's duties. 79 Thus, some courts
held that because the trustee was responsible for managing trust prop-
erty, a trustee could not pay an investment advisor for help in manag-
ing the trust portfolio. 80 The doctrine recognized that a trustee might
need professional help and did permit the trustee to use trust funds to
pay lawyers8' and real estate brokers,82 but that right did not always
extend to investment advisors.8 3
The reformers, however, concluded that as the class of permissi-
ble trust investments has expanded, the likelihood has diminished
that an individual trustee, or even a corporate trustee, has the exper-
tise to evaluate each potential investment without outside assistance.8 4
As a result, to implement modern portfolio theory, trustees should be
encouraged to rely on persons with expertise in making optimal in-
vestment decisions. That objective required freeing trustees from the
shackles of the "no delegation" rule.
Taken together, the reformers designed these three doctrinal
changes to afford trust beneficiaries the benefits associated with mod-
ern portfolio theory. In practice, however, the changes operated pri-
marily by relieving trustees from liability for actions inconsistent with
modern portfolio theory. The changes did not impose liability on
trustees for failing to take affirmative steps to implement modern
portfolio theory. Of the three major "reforms" to trust investment
law, only the duty to diversify imposed liability on trustees, and that
duty existed before the promulgation of the UPIA and the Restatement
(Third). Significantly, neither the Restatement (Third) nor the UPIA de-
veloped liability rules to constrain trustees from assuming too much
market risk despite modern portfolio theory's clear recognition that
78 See Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Gardiner, 733 P.2d 1102, 1106-07
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding a trustee liable to the beneficiaries for loss where the trustee
delegated investment authority to an individual with skill and expertise and the loss
stemmed from that individual), vacated, 733 P.2d 1110 (Ariz. 1987).
79 See 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 188.3, at 60-61 (4th ed. 1988) (stating that a trustee "is notjustified in charging the trust
estate with payments made to the agent if the agent is employed to do acts that are covered
by the trustee's compensation").
80 See, e.g., Stillman v. Watkins, 325 N.E.2d 294, 295 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975); In re
Badenhausen's Estate, 237 N.Y.S.2d 928, 931-32 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1963). But see In reWill of
Axe, 502 N.Y.S.2d 943, 945 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986), for a discussion of where the court author-
ized compensation for investment counsel upon a showing of necessity.
81 See, e.g., Hanscom v. Maiden & Melrose Gaslight Co., 125 N.E. 626, 628 (Mass.
1920); In re Foster's Estate, 176 A. 156, 157-58 (N.J. Orphans' CL 1934).
82 See, e.g., Appeal of Burke, 108 A.2d 58, 64-65 (Pa. 1954).
83 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
84 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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diversification alone would not effectively protect investors against
market risk.85
II
REEXAMINING MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AS A BASIS FOR
TRUST INVESTING
In the mid-1990s, when the UPIA and the Restatement (Third) were
drafted, modern portfolio theory-together with its cousin, the
ECMH-had become the accepted wisdom. The drafters of the UPIA
and the Restatement (Third) took modern portfolio theory's insights as
a given; the difficulty was incorporating those insights into trust law
doctrine.
Since the mid-1990s, the stock market has endured two signifi-
cant jolts. When the dot-coin bubble burst in 2000, the S&P 500
plunged from a closing high of 1527.46 points on March 24, 2000, to a
closing low of 776.76 points on October 9, 2002.86 As the subprime
mortgage market disintegrated, the S&P 500 lost more than half of its
value, its stock dropping from a closing high of 1565.15 points on
October 9, 2007, to a closing low of 676.53 points on March 9, 2009.87
In the ten-year period from June 1, 1999, through June 1, 2009, the
S&P 500 fell from 1294.26 points8 to 942.87 points, 9 more than 25
percent. Although these precipitous declines do not disprove the in-
sights of modern portfolio theory, they do suggest that it is time to
reexamine whether modern portfolio theory provides a solid founda-
tion for trust investment practices.
Modern portfolio theory rests on three basic premises, each of
which the Restatement (Third) comments explicitly endorse. First, risk-
ier investments typically generate a higher expected return because
investors will eschew such investments unless they are offered a risk
premium. 90 Second, diversification of investments can reduce risk
85 The Restatement (Third) does caution that trustees must give "careful consideration"
to the "risk-reward tradeoffs ... after considering the potential cash-need consequences."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. g (2007). The Restatement (Third) does not,
however, provide a concrete liability rule.
86 See Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Broad S&P 500 Hits Record High: Market Slowly Recovers
from Tech Bust, WASH. POST, May 31, 2007, at Al.
87 Id.
88 See Dow Up, Nasdaq Down After a Volatile Session, WASH. POST, June 2, 1999, at E2.
89 See Adam Shell, Encouraging Reports Send Stocks Soaring: Data Hint Recession Losing
Steam, USA TODAY, June 2, 2009, at lB.
90 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. g:
[C]ommon stocks can be expected to outperform bonds in the long run
but yet to have poorer returns-even negative returns-during some peri-
ods. Because investors are risk averse, they require extra compensation for
increased risk. The investor's reward for accepting a greater likelihood of
volatile returns follows from the lower market price at which the investor is
able to purchase the investment.
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without compromising expected return. 9 1 A corollary of this premise
applicable in the trust context is that any investment is a suitable trust
investment so long as the investment is diversified appropriately.92
Third, a portfolio deals optimally with "market risk" or "compensated
risk" by adjusting the percentage of the portfolio devoted to high-risk,
high-return investments. 93
This Part starts by explaining that the first premise-that riskier
investments will generate a higher expected return-depends more
on investor psychology than it does on mathematical formulae or inev-
itable economic truth. In particular, if and when all investors believe
that equities generate a higher expected return than other invest-
ments, the expected return of equities will decline. The second pre-
mise-that diversification reduces risk without reducing expected
return-is mathematically true assuming there exists a reliable mecha-
nism for ascertaining the risk and expected return of individual invest-
ments. Although many proponents of modern portfolio theory relied
on market price as a mechanism for identifying risk and return, re-
cent scholarship and market gyrations undermine the hypothesis that
market price accurately reflects risk or expected return. Finally, the
third premise-that a portfolio optimally deals with market risk by ad-
justing the percentage of high-risk, high-return investments-remains
a sensible strategy in the face of market uncertainty.
A. Riskier Investments Generate Higher Returns
Modern portfolio theory's premise that "riskier" investments
(particularly in common stocks) generate higher returns than less
risky investments (e.g., corporate and government bonds) rests on
some common-sense propositions. First, the premise assumes that in-
vestors are risk averse and that investors insist on a higher expected
91 See id. § 90 cmt. e(1) ("Because market pricing cannot be expected to recognize
and reward a particular investor's failure to diversify, a trustee's acceptance of this type of
risk cannot, without more, be justified on grounds of enhancing expected return.").
92 See id. § 90 cmt. f ("Specific investments or techniques are not per se prudent or
imprudent. The riskiness of a specific property, and thus the propriety of its inclusion in
the trust estate, is not judged in the abstract but in terms of its anticipated effect on the
particular trust's portfolio.").
93 See id. § 90 cmt. e(1):
[N]o objective, general legal standard can be set for a degree of risk that is
or is not prudent under the rule of this Section. Beneficiaries can be dis-
served by undue conservatism as well as by excessive risk-taking. Decisions
concerning a prudent or suitable level of market risk for a particular trust
can be reached only after thoughtful consideration of its purposes and all
of the relevant trust and beneficiary circumstances. This process includes,
for example, balancing the trust's return requirements with its tolerance
for volatility.
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return for a higher-risk investment than for a lower-risk investment.94
Second, the premise assumes that equity investments are inherently
riskier than debt investments because bondholders enjoy priority over
stockholders when companies go sour.95 From these two premises, it
follows that investors will demand a higher return from stocks than
from fixed-income investments. These common-sense propositions
find support in historical returns. As the Restatement (Third) points
out, "[h]istorically, corporate stocks have provided greater total re-
turn over the long term than bonds. '96 Although common sense and
history support the proposition that stocks generate higher returns
than fixed-income investments, the proposition itself is far from
inevitable. 97
1. The Contingency of Risk Aversion
Suppose investors in the aggregate were not risk averse but were
risk preferring.98 If so, risky enterprises would not have to pay a risk
premium to potential investors; instead, investors might flock to those
enterprises even if the expected return on their investments were
lower than the expected return on more stable investments. In this
hypothetical circumstance, it would make no sense for risk-averse
94 See id. § 90 cmt. g ("Because investors are risk averse, they require extra compensa-
ion for increased risk. The investor's reward for accepting a greater likelihood of volatile
returns follows from the lower market price at which the investor is able to purchase the
investment.").
95 Cf Langbein & Posner, supra note 36, at 7-8 (" [T] here is less risk to being a bond-
holder since he has the cushion of the equity shareholders, who would have to be wiped
out completely before he could lose his interest.").
96 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. 1. The widely cited Ibbotson study cal-
culates the average rates of return on common stocks, long-term corporate bonds, long-
term government bonds, and treasury bills from 1926-87 and concluded that the average
annual rate of return on the four investments was, respectively, 12.0, 5.2, 4.6, and 3.5 per-
cent annually. ROGER G. IBBOTSON & REx A. SINQUEFIELD, STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS, AND IN-
FLATION: HISTORICAL RETuRNS (1926-1987) 72 (1989).
97 As Paul Haskell explained nearly twenty years ago,
[t]he "laws" of economics are different from the laws of nature, such as
gravity, for example. What happened yesterday in nature is an excellent
predictor of what will happen tomorrow. The same assurance does not ex-
ist with respect to past economic experience. Contemporary portfolio the-
ory is all a reflection of the immediate past, and it is uncertain that the
future will be consistent with the immediate past.
Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and Modern Portfolio Theory, 69
N.C. L. REv 87, 103 (1990).
98 Risk aversion and risk preference are crude labels for describing attitudes towards
risk. Negative pangs from losses may exceed positive pangs from gains, supporting a psy-
chological theory of risk aversion. See NASSiM NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS:
THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN LIFE AND IN THE MARKETS 67-68 (2d ed. 2004). But one
hundred small gains may create emotional satisfaction that outweighs the risk of a single
loss one hundred times as great, a result at odds with the "risk aversion" label. See id. at
192-93.
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trustees to invest in risky enterprises. Is this hypothetical circum-
stance sufficiently plausible to merit consideration?
Robert Shiller, among others, has argued that risk aversion is, at
least in part, a cultural phenomenon. 99 The prevalence of gambling
itself establishes that risk aversion is not an omnipresent phenome-
non, and Shiller argues that the increased frequency of gambling
makes it natural for people to "graduate to [gambling's] more upscale
form, speculation in securities."'100 Moreover, empirical evidence sup-
ports the proposition that investors do not always act with a risk-averse
frame of mind. First, researchers have concluded that investors often
act on a principle of "loss aversion"; rather than realizing losses on
stocks, investors retain these stocks and expose themselves to risks
greater than those justified by the expected future return on those
stocks.101 Second, studies have established that when investors make
significant investment profits, they often subject themselves to greater
risk with these profits, or "found money,"10 2 than they would if they
had not enjoyed recent successes. Neither of these findings supports
the conclusion that investors generally are risk preferring, but the
findings do undermine the conclusion that investors are universally
risk averse.
2. The Feedback Problem: Does Widespread Acceptance of Modem
Portfolio Theory Undermine Its Premises?
Assume now that investors as a group are risk averse. In a world
of risk-averse investors, do common stocks offer investors a risk pre-
mium? According to modern portfolio theory, the risk of a particular
firm performing poorly or failing altogether does not require that
firm to pay investors a risk premium because that firm-specific risk is
99 See RoBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 54 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that the
rise in gambling institutions and gambling acts over the past century has had cultural im-
pacts on society).
100 Id.
101 See Terrance Odean, Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses , 53 J. FIN. 1775,
1775-76 (1998); Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and
Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777, 778 (1985); see also Donald C.
Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities
Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 144 (2002) (discussing the bias of loss aversion and how
investors "tend to be more risk-seeking" when trying to avoid a loss).
102 See Langevoort, supra note 101; see also Nicholas Barberis & Ming Huang, Mental
Accounting, Loss Aversion, and Individual Stock Returns, 56J. FIN. 1247, 1249 (2001) (asserting
that good recent performance of a stock will cause "the investor [to] perceive[ ] the stock
to be less risky than before"). See generally Nicholas Barberis et al., Prospect Theory and Asset
Prices, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2001) (explaining that an investor's loss aversion depends on the
relative investment's prior performance and that prior gain will make subsequent losses
more bearable).
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diversifiable. 10 3 That is, if there were no market risk, given the prem-
ises of modern portfolio theory, common stocks would not command
a risk premium. Any risk premium is purely the product of market
risk-the risk that a particular firm will suffer because the market as a
whole declines.
The risk premium associated with any stock, therefore, should de-
pend on two factors: the likelihood that the market will decline and
the sensitivity of the particular stock to market declines.1 0 4 If the risk
of market decline did not exist, there would be no reason for any
stock to require a risk premium. 10 5 How, then, do investors measure
the risk of market decline? Modern portfolio theory tends to mini-
mize that risk. Although it informs of the risks associated with com-
mon stocks, it also emphasizes that the expected return on common
stocks typically will be higher than the expected return on other in-
vestments.106 Investors also understand that fixed-income investments
generate their own risks, particularly inflation risks.107 For any inves-
tor with a long time horizon, then, the message may well be that the
risk associated with common-stock investment is no greater than the
risk associated with other investment choices.108 If enough investors
develop that belief, money will flow from other investments to com-
mon stocks, driving down or eliminating the risk premium associated
with common stocks. Data supporting the proposition that stocks
have outperformed bonds in every relevant span of time also support
the proposition that stock-market investing involves little risk; in peri-
ods of steady rise in stock prices, investors are even more likely to
underestimate the risks associated with market decline. 10 9
The ECMH suggests that any such risk is trivial. At its core,
ECMH holds that the market price of securities fully reflects all availa-
103 See BREALEY & MYr.S, supra note 33, at 141 ("The capital asset pricing model states
that investors do not demand extra expected return just to cover a firm's unique risk.").
104 The sensitivity of a particular stock's return to market changes generally is known
as the stock's beta. Id. at 134.
105 See id. at 132 ("[T] here is also some risk that you [cannot] avoid however much you
diversify. This risk is generally known as market risk." (emphasis omitted)).
106 See id. at 125-26 (observing that investors in common stock received higher average
premiums than investors in treasury bills); Langbein, supra note 14, at 645 ("[T]he long-
term real rate of return on equities has greatly exceeded bonds."); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. 1 (2007) ("Historically, corporate stocks have provided
greater total return over the long term than bonds . . ").
107 See Langbein, supra note 14, at 645 (describing inflation risks with bonds).
108 See SHILLER, supra note 99, at 196 (arguing that "the public does not appear to
perceive much risk in the stock market" and that risk of a "major stock market decline[]
does not worry most people very much").
109 See id. at 60 (stating that investor confidence in positive stock market performance
is more prominent when investors have experienced stock price increases); see also id. at
69-70 (explaining that past price increases generate expectations of future increases and
that investor confidence increases with a history of price increases).
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ble information about the future prospects of those securities. 110 If
one accepts this hypothesis, it is not possible for investors as a group
systematically to overvalue securities because no other "expert" opin-
ion can provide a baseline for valuation that is superior to the baseline
provided by the market collectively.111 Once lauded as "the best estab-
lished fact in all the social sciences,"1 2 the ECMH has endured signifi-
cant attack, and recent market turmoil has led many to rethink its
premises. 1 3 Gyrations in the stock market and in the housing market
have led to suggestions that market prices have as much to do with the
psychology of investors as with a close analysis of the prospects of indi-
vidual securities or assets.11 4 The jury is still out on how efficient mar-
kets are. For present purposes, however, what is critical is that a key
assumption embedded in the UPIA and the Restatement (Third)-the
assumption that investments in common stock pay a risk premium
that reflects market risk-is dependent on ECMH. In the absence of
ECMH, it would be possible for investors as a group to underestimate
the risks of market decline. If investors generally underestimate that
risk, then for the risk-averse investor, stocks will be overpriced relative
to fixed-income investments. That is, stocks will not generate suffi-
cient return to warrant the risks not perceived by the investing com-
munity more generally.
B. Diversification Eliminates Concerns About Firm-Specific Risk
1. Market Declines Do Not Undermine the Case for Diversification
Modern portfolio theory teaches us that for each set of invest-
ments with a given expected return, an investor can reduce the risk
associated with that return by diversification.11 5 If an investor identi-
110 See Fama, supra note 42, at 383-86 (defining an efficient market as one that fully
reflects available information).
III See SHILLER, supra note 99, at 179 ("[ECMH] claims that the smartest people will
not be able to do better than the least intelligent people in terms of investment perform-
ance. They can do no better because their superior understanding is already completely
incorporated into share prices.").
112 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WAsH &
LEE L. REV. 767, 773 (2002); see Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak
to the Market, 77 VA. L. REv. 945, 967 (1991).
113 For instance, ECMH does not assume that all investors are rational and informed
but instead assumes that when zealots overpay for an asset, the "smart money" immediately
seizes on an investment opportunity and corrects any mispricing. See SHILLER, supra note
99, at 182 (discussing the work of Edward Miller on this topic). But short-sales constraints
on markets often will prevent the smart money from acting to correct pricing errors. See id.
114 Shiller, for instance, argues that herd behavior plays an important role in setting
market prices. See id. at 159-61. People who know better are unduly respectful of others in
formulating their own judgments, and they then become so overconfident in those judg-
ments that valuable information about fundamental values of securities is neither dissemi-
nated nor evaluated. See id.
115 See BREALE & MYERs, supra note 33, at 131-32.
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fies ten stocks with an identical expected firm-specific risk and an
identical expected annual return of 8 percent, the investor can
achieve that same 8-percent return with less risk by investing in all ten
stocks rather than investing in any one of them. Diversification
reduces risk because the ten stocks are unlikely to move in perfect
lockstep.. Optimal diversification requires more than purchasing
many stocks with the same expected return; it also requires minimiz-
ing the covariance among those stocks.1 16 Purchasing ten different oil
stocks, each with the same expected return and firm-specific risk, will
reduce overall risk less than purchasing stocks in a variety of indus-
tries. 1' 7 Markowitz built the mathematical foundations for these in-
sights more than half a century ago."18
The technology-bubble burst in 2000 and the fallout from the
subprime mortgage crisis in 2008-09 did not undermine Markowitz's
mathematical model; these occurrences merely highlighted the
model's limits. Markowitz's model did not assume that it was easy to
determine expected return and covariance; indeed, Markowitz ex-
pressly reserved judgment about how best to develop relevant beliefs
concerning those variables.11 9 The precipitous NASDAQ decline un-
derscored the high covariance among start-up companies, particularly
those that were technology based. The more recent mortgage debacle
revealed significant, but not previously transparent, covariance among
disparate sectors of the economy. Expected return may be even more
difficult to assess because, as many individuals now recognize, invest-
ment returns may depend as much on investor psychology as they do
on economic fundamentals.120 Difficulties in assessing variance and
expected return, however, increase the importance even of imperfect
diversification; if uncertainty is omnipresent, prudence suggests hedg-
ing one's bets.
The principal challenge to diversification as an investment strat-
egy comes from those individuals who believe that savvy investors can
reduce risk and increase return more effectively by careful study of
the "fundamentals" associated with a smaller number of investments.
That is, an alternative strategy would be to heed advice variously at-
tributed to both Andrew Carnegie and Mark Twain: "Put all your eggs
116 Markowitz, supra note 28, at 89.
117 See id. (suggesting that investors diversify across industries because firms in differ-
ent industries have lower covariances than firms within the same industry).
118 See supra Part I.B.1.
I19 See Markowitz, supra note 28, at 91.
120 See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERTJ. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN PSYcHOL-
OG DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATrERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 69-73 (2009)
(concluding that the Great Depression endured for as long as it did in large measure
because investor confidence was shattered and noting that many economists, "who gener-
ally see no advantage in contemporary assessments of market psychology that cannot be
scientifically confirmed today," ignored the economic malaise of the era).
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in one basket and watch the basket."'121 Whether this strategy can beat
a diversification strategy over time remains a subject of dispute in both
academic literature and the financial press. The empirical evidence
suggests that it will be a rare investor who can consistently "beat the
market."'2 2 In light of this evidence, the case for requiring diversifica-
tion remains a strong one; it appears unlikely that trust beneficiaries
as a whole would be better off if trust law doctrine relieved trustees of
the obligation to diversify. 123
2. Diversification Does Not Make Every Investment Suitable
The Restatement (Third) announces that "[s] pecific investments or
techniques are not per se prudent or imprudent."124 The UPIA takes
a similar position. 125 Both documents claim to derive this position
from modern portfolio theory's endorsement of diversification as a
mechanism for reducing risk. Professor John Langbein's explanation
and defense of these reforms makes explicit their connection to mod-
ern portfolio theory: "[t]he idea that some securities are intrinsically
too risky for trust investors collides with the central findings of
[m]odern [p]ortfolio [t]heory."126
The connection between modern portfolio theory and the con-
clusion that any investment, in context, can be a prudent investment,
is more complicated than suggested in both the Restatement (Third)
and the UPIA. Markowitz's seminal article demonstrated that when
an investor located investments with high expected return and low
variance, the investor could fare better by diversifying among those
investments. 127 Markowitz's article never suggested that every invest-
ment would be sensible if appropriately diversified; quite the contrary,
it acknowledged that more work was needed to develop a strategy for
121 Gordon, supra 22, at 98 (quoting In re Estate of Adriance, 260 N.Y.S. 173, 181 (N.Y.
Sur. Ct. 1932)) (attributing the quotation to Andrew Carnegie); see Lawrence A. Cunning-
ham, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America, 19 CARDozo L. REV. 1, 14
(1997) (quoting Mark Twain's advice from Pudd'nhead Wilson). Lawrence Cunningham
associates the advice with Warren Buffett. Cunningham, supra.
122 See generally Brad Barber et a., Can Investors Profit from the Prophets? Security Analyst
Recommendations and Stock Returns, 56 J. FIN. 531, 532-35 (2001) (analyzing data showing
that individual investors can beat the market by following consensus recommendations by
analysts, but suggesting that the transaction costs of such a strategy generally would wipe
out any gains).
123 See Dobris, supra note 25, at 485-86 (emphasizing that "[t] rusts outnumber compe-
tent-at-investing trustees" and suggesting that passive investing will generally do less harm
to trust beneficiaries as a class).
124 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. f (2007).
125 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR AcT § 2 cmt. (1994) (Abrogating Categoric Restrictions)
(clarifying that no particular kind of property or type of investment is inherently
imprudent).
126 Langbein, supra note 14, at 649.
127 Markowitz, supra note 28, at 82-90.
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identifying the expected return and low variance of individual
securities. 28
The ECMH attempted to fill the gap acknowledged by Markowitz.
It was unnecessary (and largely pointless) to develop a strategy for
identifying risk and return because the market price already reflected
all the available information from which one could construct the strat-
egy. 129 If one accepts the ECMH in its strongest form, every invest-
ment is a suitable investment at its market price. By contrast, if the
ECMH were not true, a prudent and diligent investor could identify
some investments that were overpriced relative to alternative invest-
ments with comparable risk. Those overpriced investments would be
imprudent for individual investors and certainly for trustees.
The behavioral economics literature challenges the ECMH, con-
tending that the pricing of individual securities (and of the market
generally) reflects investor psychology as much as it reflects economic
fundamentals.13 0 A "herd" mentality causes many investors to bid up
the price of securities (or to sell them off) without an economic foun-
dation for their investment decisions. 131 Even the most ardent propo-
nents of the ECMH concede that some investors do not act rationally
in incorporating available information into investment decisions, but
they do suggest that more knowledgeable investors will engage in arbi-
trage that will ensure that market prices remain the best estimate of
value. 132
Arbitrage, however, is difficult when a buying frenzy drives prices
higher than fundamentals can justify. Arbitrageurs can cure over-
pricing only by short selling, which is often difficult.133 Robert Shiller
offers the following example: Shortly after the initial public offering
of stock in eToys in 1999, the value of the stock was $8 billion even
though the company's 1998 sales were only $30 million and its profits
totaled negative $28.6 million.13 4 By comparison, Toys 'R' Us-a com-
128 See id. at 91.
129 See Fama, supra note 42, at 384.
130 Cf GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 200-03 (detailing the patent irrationality in the mar-
ket pricing of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. shares, alternately based on public pessi-
mism and on public optimism). See generally SHILLER, supra note 99, at 157-60 (discussing
the impact of social influence on stock market behavior).
131 See generally Langevoort, supra note 101, at 149 (citing evidence of a herd mentality
even among investment professionals). Langevoort also provides some examples of the
herd mentality among nonprofessionals. For example, he discusses a dramatic rise in stock
prices of a licensing company following a New York Times story about a medical break-
through that was already public information. See id. at 138. Another example concerns a
fraud scheme in which investors purchased stock relying on tips posted on the Internet.
See id. at 156.
132 See SHILLER, supra note 99, at 179 ("[T]he smartest money has already mostly taken
over the market through its profitable trading and has now set prices correctly ...
133 For a discussion about the constraints of short selling, see id. at 182.
134 See id. at 181.
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pany with sales of $11.2 billion and profits totaling $376 million-had
a stock value of only $6 billion.13 5
Arbitrage is a particularly implausible solution to the mispricing
of investments when there is little basis for assessing the investment's
expected return or risk, and this situation often will be the case for
start-up companies.13 6 The eToys example is illustrative. The com-
pany's stock price in 1999 was based not on current sales or profits but
on exuberance about the future of Internet sales. But prospective
purchasers-informed or uninformed-had little basis for assessing
the risk or reward associated with eToys and had no economic basis
(other than "irrational exuberance") for concluding that the expected
return justified an investment at the market price for the shares.
Purchasing shares in eToys was much like purchasing a lottery ticket
without knowing either the prize or the number of tickets that would
ultimately be sold; in each case, the purchaser has no good way of
assessing risk or return. Buying shares in many such entities (or buy-
ing many such lottery tickets) does not make the investment
prudent.13 7
Put another way, diversification is a mathematically optimal strat-
egy for reducing quantifiable risk without sacrificing expected return.
Given any portfolio, adding a stock with the same expected return and
low covariance as other stocks in the portfolio preserves return while
diminishing risk. Nevertheless with many stocks-particularly with
new issues-the investor has no significant basis for determining ex-
pected return or covariance.13 8 As a result, there is no reason to be-
lieve that adding that stock will preserve expected return or reduce
risk. 13 9 Adding the stock does not accomplish the objectives of diversi-
135 See id.; see also MichaelJ. Cooper et al., A Rose.com by Any Other Name, 56J. FIN. 2371,
2379 (2001) (observing that, during the technology bubble, changing a firm's name to add
".com," ".net," or the word "Internet" caused an abnormal return of 53 percent over a five-
day period and 89 percent over a sixty-one-day period).
136 A similar problem exists with closely held enterprises where the market may be
particularly thin.
137 Of course, buying actual lottery tickets with a known negative expected return does
not constitute an "investment" at all and would inevitably subject the trustee to liability. See
Dobris, supra note 25, at 463-64.
138 Graham observed that the market is particularly likely to price new issues irration-
ally for two reasons. See GRA-iAM, supra note 26, at 142-43. First, unreliable salesmanship
typically accompanies new issues. Second, and perhaps more important, companies re-
lease new issues more frequently in times when market conditions are particularly
favorable to sellers (and therefore less favorable to buyers), that is, at times when "the large
and quick profits shown by common stocks as a whole are sufficient to dull the public's
critical faculty, just as they sharpen its acquisitive instinct." Id. at 142.
139 Even when a firm has an established track record, there is no mathematically pre-
cise way of determining the likelihood that the past will be prologue to the future. As
Nassim Nicholas Taleb notes, "unlike a well-defined[,] precise game like Russian roulette,
where the risks are visible to anyone capable of multiplying and dividing by six, one does
not observe the barrel of reality." TALEB, supra note 98, at 26. The probability that the firm
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fication. Acceptance of the ECMH would ameliorate this problem by
assuming that market prices provide significant evidence about ex-
pected return and risk and thus would provide a rationale for broad
diversification. But if, for some stocks, market price provides suspect
evidence about expected return or risk, diversification provides little
justification for including those stocks in a portfolio-particularly in a
trust portfolio.
C. A Trust Portfolio Optimally Deals with Market Risk by
Adjusting the Percentage of High-Risk, High-Return
Investments
Diversification minimizes firm-specific risk but does not protect
investors (particularly trust investors) against market risk. Both the
Restatement (Third) and the UPIA suggest that a prudent trustee must
assess the risk tolerance of a trust and invest accordingly. 40 Recent
market reversals do not cast doubt on the wisdom of that conclusion.
Before the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA, trustees typically
dealt with risk tolerance by avoiding volatile investments. The Restate-
ment (Third) and the UPIA sought to release trustees from that ap-
proach for two reasons: First, even "safe" investments generate
significant inflation risk. Second, in light of the higher expected re-
turn on equity investments, a prudent trustee would be better advised
to moderate the amount of the portfolio invested in equities rather
than to avoid equities entirely. Among the ways in which the trustee
might reduce the risk level of the trust would be to combine high-risk,
high-expected-return investments with an appropriate proportion of
low-risk investment-a strategy developed in finance literature and ex-
plicitly endorsed in the Restatement (Third).14 1
Recent market reverses establish that it is not inevitable that, over
the long term, equities will outperform bonds or even treasury bills.
But that fact does not suggest that it would be prudent for a trustee
might falter is not mathematically measurable. See AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 120, at
144 (distinguishing measurable risk from unmeasurable uncertainty). But as the number
of variables increases-as it does if the firm has no track history at all-the ability to assess
"risk" and "expected return" becomes even more tenuous.
140 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e(l) (2007) ("Decisions concerning
a prudent or suitable level of market risk for a particular trust can be reached only after
thoughtful consideration of its purposes and all of the relevant trust and beneficiary cir-
cumstances. This process includes, for example, balancing the trust's return requirements
with its tolerance for volatility."); see also UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR Act § 2 cmt. (1994)
(Abrogating Categoric Restrictions) ("It is the trustee's task to invest at a risk level that is
suitable to the purposes of the trust.").
141 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(l) ("A trustee may find it prefera-
ble, for example, to reduce risk by mixing a moderately risky portfolio with essentially
'riskless' assets (such as short-term federal obligations), rather than by developing a low-
risk portfolio for the entire trust estate.").
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with a long-term time horizon to avoid equities. Such a strategy gener-
ally would expose the trust beneficiaries to inflation risk. Further-
more, despite recent reverses, equities may outperform fixed-income
investments. It would be irrational and imprudent to ignore the his-
torical returns of equities in establishing a trust portfolio, just as it
would be irrational and imprudent to ignore more recent market
events. These recent events emphasize the standard caveat that past
performance is no guarantee of future results. In the face of uncer-
tainty, hedging one's bets remains a sensible strategy.
D. Summary
Modern portfolio theory started with a mathematical insight that
remains as true today as it was when first developed: if we can identify
a number of investments with high expected return, we can achieve
the same expected return with less risk if we diversify among those
investments. If the risk associated with each investment is indepen-
dent of the risk associated with the other selected investments, diversi-
fication will be a particularly effective mechanism for reducing risk.
The mathematics, however, say nothing about how to determine
risk and expected return. Modern portfolio theory dealt with that gap
by looking at historical data that revealed larger returns on equity in-
vestments and by explaining that data with the intuitively appealing
idea that investors are generally risk averse and therefore demand a
"risk premium" for investing in stocks. As a result, equities were essen-
tial for a portfolio that sought to maximize return; the only reason to
temper investment in equities would be to reduce market risk. More-
over, the ECMH essentially made it unnecessary to focus on which eq-
uities belong in a trust portfolio because market prices would reflect
the best available information about future return.
Recent scholarship and recent events suggest that faith in both
the superior performance of equities and in the ECMH has been ex-
cessive. Whether investors are risk averse is a matter of psychology
rather than economics. And even if most investors are risk averse, the
accepted wisdom that inflation erodes fixed-income investments and
that equities outperform other investments might lead many investors
to conclude that equities are the least risky long-term investments, thus
depleting the "risk premium" associated with equities. Because of the
inflation risks associated with alternative investments and because pru-
dence generally counsels against overconfidence in any one strategy
in an uncertain world, equities retain an important role in prudent
trust investing; this role is not the same role equities would play if it
were clear that in the "long run" equities always outperform other in-
vestments. Finally, the notion that any investment can be a prudent
[Vol. 95:851
RETHINKING TRUST LAW REFORM
trust investment requires Herculean faith in the ECMH-faith not
borne out by market data.
III
PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE: REEXAMINING DOCTRINAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW LEARNING ABOUT
INVESTMENT PRACTICE
As the preceding Part demonstrates, neither recent market
reverses nor significant advances in scholarship require outright rejec-
tion of modern portfolio theory; they do, however, suggest that some
aspects of modern portfolio theory-particularly the tenet that every
investment is, in proper context, a suitable investment-cannot with-
stand careful scrutiny. This Part focuses on the doctrinal implementa-
tion of modern portfolio theory. Even if one were to accept all of the
principles of the modern portfolio theory that the UPIA and the Re-
statement (Third) endorse, the doctrinal structure that those enact-
ments establish provides an inadequate framework for assuring that
trustees apply those principles to their trust investments. And to the
extent that modern portfolio theory underestimates particular invest-
ment risks, the doctrinal structure magnifies the risk to trust
beneficiaries.1 42
A. Is Trust Investing Different from Individual Investing?
Common law courts concluded that trustees charged with invest-
ing trust funds should not approach trust investment decisions the
same way they approach investment of personal assets. The prevailing
wisdom that trustees should be more conservative with trust funds was
based on the assumption that the settlor's primary investment objec-
tive typically was maintenance of trust principal.1 43
Since it has become apparent that a "conservative" investment
strategy subjects the trust portfolio to different risks144-risks that
often are inconsistent with settlor objectives-is there any reason for
trustees to invest more conservatively than individual investors would?
Settlors create trusts for a myriad of different purposes, including tax
avoidance, asset protection, and maintenance of family members. 145
In many circumstances, the trust settlor would want the trustee to tol-
erate considerable volatility so long as expected return was high. In
other circumstances, such as those in which the settlor's primary ob-
jective is to provide for a family member for a limited time, volatility
142 See infra Part IlI.B.
143 See supra Part II.
144 See supra Part I.A.
145 See generally JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS
529-657 (3d ed. 2007) (cataloguing reasons for creating trusts).
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would present more of a problem. 46 Ultimately, the trust settlor
should play the primary role in determining the trustee's investment
policy. As a result, the primary issue for trust law doctrine is to devise
default rules that sophisticated settlors and trustees can modify. 47
The more sophisticated that the settlor and the trustee are, the
more likely it is that both parties will explicitly consider and agree on
investment policies for the trust.1 4  Default rules, therefore, assume
greater significance with smaller trusts that less sophisticated trust set-
tlors create. In these cases, a conservative bias is more likely to reflect
the settlor's preferences than is true among trust settlors more gener-
ally. With smaller trusts, the beneficiaries are more likely to need trust
income or principal at a particular time; this situation could arise, for
instance, where the individual who created the trust previously served
as the trust beneficiary's primary source of support. For such a benefi-
ciary, severe market fluctuations could cause sudden lifestyle disrup-
tions that the trust settlor does not anticipate or want. 149 As a result,
there is good reason to develop a default rule that limits market risk
even if a somewhat lower expected return will accompany that re-
duced risk.15 1
B. The Agency-Cost Problem
Unlike individual investors, trustees do not reap the benefits or
suffer the losses that result from their investment decisions. As a re-
sult, the trust relationship generates agency costs, raising questions
about the role legal doctrine can and should play in addressing any
mismatch between the interests of the beneficiaries and the agent
(the trustee).1 51 Modern portfolio theory did not beget agency costs;
the interests of trustees have never been aligned perfectly with the
146 See Haskell, supra note 97, at 109 (mentioning that investing in high-volatility stocks
"is inconsistent with the ultra-conservative purposes of the family trust").
147 See generally Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of De-
fault Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 68-72 (2005) (discussing scholarly recognition of fiduciary
duties as default rules and the ability to waive these rules, and introducing a framework to
limit parties' powers to change these default rules).
148 See id. at 71 n.19 (citing UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008 cmt. (2000)) (including sophisti-
cation of the settlor with respect to business and fiduciary matters as a factor in determin-
ing whether the modification of the trustee's duties was fair).
149 Similarly, asset allocation in 401(k) retirement plans varies considerably by em-
ployee salary. Employees with higher salaries tend to invest significantly more in equities
and less in money-market and guaranteed income investment options. SeeJACK VANDERHEI
ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCI INST., 401 (i) PLAN ASSET ALLOCATION, ACCOUNT BA1_
ANCES, AND LOAN AcrriY IN 2007, 24 fig. 21 (2008), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/
EBRIlIB_12a-2008.pdf.
150 Cf Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1519, 1562-66 (1997) (suggesting the development of investment vehicles for reduc-
ing retirement plan volatility even if the result is a somewhat lower return).
151 See generally Sitkoff, supra note 5 (discussing the agency costs inherent in trust law).
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interests of trust beneficiaries. 152 Fiduciary duties-particularly the
duty of loyalty and the duty of care-operate in part to induce trustees
to act in the interests of trust beneficiaries.15 3
Consider now the trustee's duties with respect to investment of
trust funds. Traditional theory starts with the premises that the trust
settlor's primary goal is preservation of trust principal and that trust
beneficiaries are best off when the trust generates maximum income
consistent with investments that minimize risk to trust principal.1 54 So
long as preservation of trust principal is treated as the trust's primary
objective, aligning the trustee's interests with those of the trust benefi-
ciaries is not difficult. Imposing liability on a trustee who makes in-
vestments that place trust principal at risk creates the right incentives;
because the trustee receives no personal benefit from the higher re-
turns generated from those investments but does bear the downside
loss associated with those investments, the trustee who is at all sensi-
tive to financial incentives will avoid risking trust principal-the hy-
pothesized goal of the trust settlor.155 As a result, both the "legal list"
approach and the traditional "prudent person" standard, with their
prohibition on "speculative" investments, were well calculated to mini-
mize agency costs.
Rejection of traditional theory complicated the agency-cost prob-
lem. Decades of inflation made it clear that no investment strategy
could avoid risk altogether because even government bonds were sub-
ject to a significant inflation risk. 156 As a result, the "prudent" trustee
could look to no single talisman in making investment decisions be-
cause an investment strategy that balanced risk and return would best
serve the beneficiaries. How, then, should the legal system encourage
trustees to take appropriate risks?
One alternative would be to rely largely on the market to police
trustees. That is, doctrine could largely ignore the agency-cost prob-
lem by assuming that trustees who inadequately serve the interests of
settlors and beneficiaries will find it difficult to attract clients. This
assumption of market discipline, however, seems implausible.
Although Langbein argues that the prospect of repeat business from
trust lawyers acting on behalf of their clients may provide a market
152 See id. at 640 (highlighting the tensions that exist between a trustee and the trust
beneficiary).
153 See id. at 679 (analyzing litigious responses to breaches of fiduciary duty as incen-
tives for trustees).
154 See Shattuck, supra note 23, at 492 ("Text writers and observers of the fiduciary art
were wont to express the trustee's duties in terms of emphasis upon preservation of
principal.").
155 See Gordon, supra note 22, at 83-84 (noting that it would be improbable for trustee
to ignore liability risk).
156 See Langbein, supra note 14, at 645 ("Experience with inflation after World War II
taught that bonds placed significant inflation risk on the bondholder.").
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incentive for trustees, 15 7 Leslie and Sitkoff both note that the market
forces that may act to discipline corporate officers and directors do
not put nearly the same pressure on trustees.1 58 Few trust settlors will
be repeat players who react to their own experience with the trustee's
investment decisions. 159 And if a corporate trustee seeks to attract
new trust business, potential settlors are likely to focus on the trustee's
past returns160 and not on the risks taken to generate those returns,
thus creating an incentive for the trustee to take more risks than pru-
dent. 161 This mismatch is an especially serious problem if the focus is
on trusts in which the settlor has not specified investment strategies
because those trusts are the smallest and ones for which conservative
investment strategies may best achieve the trust settlor's objectives.
A second alternative is to develop liability rules designed to mini-
mize agency costs. But even though the market may be an imperfect
mechanism for inducing trustees to internalize agency costs, the
wrong liability rules might induce trustee behavior that subsequently
leaves beneficiaries worse off than they would be with no liability rules
at all. 162 A third potential alternative is to rely on a norm among trust-
ees that counsels against speculation. 163 Norms, however, can erode
over time, especially in the face of new legal rules. 164 The new pru-
dent investor rule might cause that kind of erosion.
157 SeeJohn H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 936-38 & n.30 (2005).
158 For instance, unlike corporate officers, a trustee need not worry about raising capi-
tal, maximizing stock price, or responding to takeover threats. Leslie, supra note 147, at
83. And the difficulties associated with removal of trustees may reduce market pressure on
a trustee. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28J.
CORP. L. 565, 571 (2003).
159 See Langbein, supra note 157, at 937 ("To be sure, the typical trust settlor is not a
repeat player ....").
160 See Gordon, supra note 22, at 84 (emphasizing competition in the market for trust
assets and noting that "demonstrably superior performance of a common trust fund helps
attract new assets to manage").
161 Taleb emphasized that investors typically flock to managers with the best track
records (creating an incentive to generate such a track record) but that a strong track
record is often purely the product of randomness rather than investment skill and often
will not be reproduced over a longer term. See generally TALEB, supra note 98, at 5-20
(discussing Nero Tulip's experience with trading and also how "a large selection of busi-
nessmen with outstanding track records will be no better than randomly thrown darts").
162 See generally Sitkoff, supra note 5, at 679-82 (discussing some behavior-inducing ef-
fects that liability rules have on trustees).
163 See Dobris, supra note 25, at 452 (discussing the idea of speculation under trust
investment law today).
164 See Leslie, supra note 147, at 90-92.
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C. The Restatement (Third) and the UPIA as Responses to the
Agency-Cost Problem
The drafters of the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA accurately
perceived an agency-cost problem-the strong disincentive for trust-
ees to invest in equities, particularly equities of companies not re-
garded as "blue chips"-generated by the structure of then-prevailing
doctrine. The drafters "solved" that problem.' 65 The solution, how-
ever, did not fully anticipate the impact that the new doctrinal struc-
ture would have on trustee incentives even assuming the truth of
modern portfolio theory and the ECMH. The doctrinal solution is
even more problematic if modern portfolio theory and the ECMH do
not accurately capture economic truth.
1. The Approach Taken by the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA
The drafters of the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA did not oper-
ate on a blank slate. Trust law doctrine historically had been ajuris-
prudence that privileged standards over rules. The prudent man
"rule" of the Restatement (Second) was the quintessential standard; it re-
quired trustees "to make such investments and only such investments
as a prudent man would make of his own property having in view the
preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of the in-
come to be derived." 166 Repeated application of the standard-like
prudent man rule, however, generated results that Austin Scott,
among others, synthesized into at least one rule-like rule: a trustee
acts imprudently if the trustee invests in common stock that does not
pay regular dividends. 167
Whether courts consistently have applied this prohibition is a
matter of some dispute.168 But the prospect that a court might apply
such a rule created a significant incentive for trustees to steer clear of
equity investments that did not pay dividends; the trustee would enjoy
little of the upside gain of such an investment but would take the risk
of liability for the entire downside loss if a court were to find the in-
vestment imprudent. 169
165 See Langbein, supra note 14, at 654 (noting that the Restatement (Third) and the
UPIA were designed to liberate trust investors when making their investment decisions).
166 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) (1959).
167 Id. § 227 cmt. m. In fact, Scott listed other categories of investments that were
imprudent per se, such as junior mortgages. See Langbein, supra note 14, at 645 (citing 3
ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 79, § 227[7], at 448-49). For a general discussion of Scott's
influence, see Gordon, supra note 22, at 57-67.
168 See Gordon, supra note 22, at 67-74 (discussing how courts applied this
prohibition).
169 Cf Sitkoff, supra note 5, at 656 (arguing that overly cautious trust management in
part reflects a legal rule that generates too much deterrence).
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As a result, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA
focused their efforts on eliminating any inference that a trustee could
be held liable for imprudence merely because the trustee invested
part of the trust portfolio in high-risk, high-expected-return securities.
The black letter of both documents emphasizes that the prudent in-
vestor standard should not apply to investments in isolation.170 The
comments speak of the "abolition of categoric restrictions against
types of investment" 171 or provide that the prudent-investor rule "does
not classify specific investments or courses of action as prudent or im-
prudent in the abstract. '172 Indeed, the Restatement (Third) devotes
separate comments to mortgages and other asset-backed securities, 173
to real estate, 74 and to venture capital, 175 making it clear that a trust
portfolio need not exclude any of these investments.
Once the drafters of the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA rejected
categoric restrictions on types of investment, they largely were content
with making marginal changes to the traditional standard-based pru-
dent man rule. The reporter's note to the Restatement (Third), for in-
stance, emphasized that nothing in the black-letter text of the
Restatement (Second)'s prudent man rule was inconsistent with the new
prudent investor rule. 176 Both the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA
stressed the importance of diversification, but the Restatement (Second)
already recognized a duty to diversify. 177 Both the Restatement (Third)
and the UPIA recognized the importance of assessing the trust's risk
tolerance before making investments, but neither document provided
any formula for the trustee to follow in assessing that tolerance 17 or
for taking that tolerance into account when formulating investment
policy. The Restatement (Third), in particular, went out of its way to
indicate that a trustee should have broad discretion in formulating
investment strategy.179 Neither the Restatement (Third) nor the UPIA
identified areas for increased trustee liability.
170 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(b) (1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 90(a) (2007).
171 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 cmt. (1994) (Abrogating Categoric Restrictions).
172 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e(1) (2007).
173 See id. § 90 cmt. n.
174 See id. § 90 cmt. o.
175 See id. § 90 cmt. p.
176 See id. § 90 reporter's notes (General Note).
177 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 228(a) (1959).
178 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 cmt. (1994) (Risk and Return) ("A trust whose
main purpose is to support an elderly widow of modest means will have a lower risk toler-
ance than a trust to accumulate for a young scion of great wealth."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e(l) ("If a trust cannot tolerate adverse outcomes in the short run, the
trustee should not adopt a high risk-reward strategy.").
179 The comments to the Restatement (Third) go on at great length to authorize both
active and passive investment strategies. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h.
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Indeed, both the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA reduced trus-
tee liability in one area: they abolished the traditional duty not to
delegate investment functions.1 80 Under traditional trust law, as em-
bodied in the Restatement (Second), a trustee who delegated investment
functions to a person with supposed expertise remained liable for any
losses resulting from the delegate's imprudence. 18 1 Responding to
criticism suggesting that the traditional rule created a disincentive to
delegation and thus deprived trust beneficiaries of expertise, the Re-
statement (Third) and the UPIA excused a trustee from liability unless
the trustee acted imprudently in selecting the delegate or in monitor-
ing the delegate's performance.1 8 2
2. Problems with the Approach Taken By Both the Restatement
(Third) and the UPIA
The standard-based approach embodied in the UPIA and the Re-
statement (Third) provides little protection to beneficiaries against a
trustee's assumption of excess market risk-or, if the approach does
provide protection, it does so at a relatively high cost. Prior trust law's
restrictions on particular categories of investments reflected a subop-
timal approach to market risk. 183 By prohibiting all investment in
broad classes of securities, prior law made it difficult for a trustee to
protect against inflation risk and also-based on the premises of mod-
ern portfolio theory-to generate optimal returns for any given level
of risk.
The drafters of the UPIA and the Restatement (Third) sensibly cast
aside these restrictions. 184 The drafters, however, provided no black-
letter substitute for the old regime's protection against market risk.
Instead, they exhorted trustees to consider the risk tolerance of the
trust in assessing how much market risk to take.1 8 5 Whether that ex-
The comments then continue to discuss and authorize a variety of investments. See id. § 90
cmts. k-p.
180 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80; see also
id. § 90 cmt. j ("The trustee is not required personally to perform all aspects of the invest-
ment function.").
181 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171.
182 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9(a) (1) (requiring reasonable care in the selec-
tion of an agent); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80(2) (requiring prudence "[i]n de-
ciding whether, to whom, and in what manner to delegate fiduciary authority . . . and
thereafter in supervising or monitoring agents"); see also UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT
§ 9(a) (3) (requiring periodic review of "the agent's actions in order to monitor the agent's
performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation").
183 See supra Part I.A.
184 See supra Part I.C.
185 A comment of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides an example of the vaguely
defined obligation imposed on trustees:
[N]o objective, general legal standard can be set for a degree of risk that is
or is not prudent under the rule of this Section. Beneficiaries can be dis-
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hortation provides beneficiaries with protection depends in part on
how courts interpret the UPIA and the Restatement (Third)-an issue
not yet free from doubt. Although the Restatement (Third) includes ex-
tensive comments, none of the comments addresses the standard of
review courts should apply to trustee investment decisions.18 6 The Re-
statement (Third) and the UPIA allow two possible interpretations.
First, courts might construe them to confer broad discretion on trust-
ees with limited judicial review of a trustee's investment judgments as
long as the trustee adequately diversifies firm-specific risk. Second,
courts might construe them as imposing on courts a responsibility to
provide more substantive oversight of the prudence of the trustee's
decisions. Neither alternative is attractive.
a. A Deferential Approach
First, consider the deferential approach, which is akin to the busi-
ness-judgment rule for corporate officers and directors.18 7 The defer-
ential approach need not insulate the trustee from all liability. The
trustee might, for instance, have to establish that he or she became
familiar with the needs of trust beneficiaries before making invest-
ment decisions. The Pennsylvania Superior Court case of In re
Scheidmantel 88 is illustrative. In the face of a trust instrument that ab-
solved the trustee of liability except for "actual fraud, gross negli-
gence[,] or willful misconduct," 189 the court held a trustee liable for
making significant investment decisions without attempting to ascer-
tain the life tenant's physical condition, prognosis, or current income
needs.190 Even if courts defer to investment decisions once a trustee
establishes adequate investigation, the Scheidmantel approach creates
an incentive for trustees to conduct a factual investigation. Neverthe-
served by undue conservatism as well as by excessive risk-taking. Decisions
concerning a prudent or suitable level of market risk for a particular trust
can be reached only after thoughtful consideration of its purposes and all
of the relevant trust and beneficiary circumstances. This process includes,
for example, balancing the trust's return requirements with its tolerance
for volatility.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e(1).
186 See generally id. § 90 (omitting discussion of a standard of review for courts).
187 Although the Restatement (Third) itself does not discuss standard of review, Jeffrey
Gordon, one of the intellectual leaders in the effort to abandon the old rule, explicitly
rejects the notion that the standard of review for trustee imprudence should resemble the
business-judgment rule. See Gordon, supra 22, at 94-96 (contrasting the potential for mar-
ket monitoring of corporate fiduciaries with the reduced potential for market monitoring
of trustees).
188 868 A.2d 464 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
189 Id. at 483 (emphasis omitted).
190 See id. at 490 (holding the trustee liable for gross negligence when the trustee ac-
quired assets with greater capital-gain potential and less immediate income without ever
examining the circumstances of the life beneficiary, who was then in a nursing home and
in deteriorating health).
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less, once the trustee conducts the examination, the court still must
decide whether to defer to the trustee's investment decisions or to
engage in substantive oversight.191
Deference avoids embroiling courts in making investment deci-
sions beyond their competence, but a deferential approach imposes
little discipline on trustees.1 92 Under prior trust law, the prospect of
liability for making speculative investments limited a trustee's incen-
tive to take risks. Without a significant prospect of liability, a trustee
seeking new business has an incentive to invest in enterprises that
promise high returns even if significant risk accompanies the high ex-
pected return. The trustee will then be able to advertise high returns
to attract prospective clients. 193 Conversely, if the market drops, the
trustee will not suffer significant comparative disadvantage because
even more cautious trustees would be unlikely to advertise heavily
that, over the previous years, their investment strategy lost relatively
little of the trust's value. In other words, the trustee benefits more
from the upside gain on a risky investment strategy than he or she
suffers from any market losses. Moreover, because trustees generally
are likely to be overly optimistic about their own investment skills,
trustees, if unconstrained, are likely to invest too aggressively. 19 4 As a
result, market forces are unlikely to be adequate to constrain trustee
behavior, and a highly deferential approach subjects a trustee to few
constraints other than market forces.
Thus, even if one accepts the strongest version of the ECMH, a
highly deferential approach might lead trustees to expose the trust
portfolio to excessive market risk. But if one accepts the ECMH, trust
beneficiaries will at least receive compensation with a greater ex-
pected return. If, however, one is skeptical of the ECMH, the agency-
cost problem is more serious; the trustee has the same incentive to
invest aggressively, but the aggressive investments do not necessarily
compensate trust beneficiaries for excess risk by providing a greater
expected return.
191 For instance, if the trustee in Scheidmantel investigated the life beneficiary's circum-
stances and then decided to invest in assets with greater capital gain potential because the
life beneficiary's future needs would be small and the potential gains to remaindermen
significant, a deferential approach would insulate the trustee from liability, while a more
active approach would result in the court's engaging in a de novo review of the prudence
of the investment decision.
192 See Leslie, supra note 147, at 99 (discussing how applying a version of the business-
judgment rule to trust law is not appropriate in the trust-law context); see also Sitkoff, supra
note 5, at 656-57 (discussing how deference is not justifiable in the trust-law context as
distinguished from the business-judgment-rule context).
193 See Gordon, supra note 22, at 82-83 (discussing the incentive structure trustees
face).
194 See Dobris, supra note 25, at 500-01 (observing that humans, in particular investors,
are naturally optimistic).
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b. An Evaluative Approach
An alternative approach to the deferential approach-and simi-
larly consistent with the language of the Restatement (Third) and the
UPIA-would have courts examine the circumstances of the trust ben-
eficiaries to determine their risk tolerance and then would evaluate
the fit between the portfolio and the risk tolerance of the benefi-
ciaries. If courts adopted this approach, concerns about liability now
would induce trustees to be more careful in fitting the investment
portfolio to the needs of the trust beneficiaries. But because the ap-
proach taken by the Restatement (Third) is standard based, greater at-
tention to the needs of the beneficiaries would not provide complete
protection against liability. First, in a standard-based regime, no
course of action is completely "safe" for the trustee. Beneficiaries
might bring an action against the trustee either for investing too con-
servatively or too aggressively. 195 So long as the trustee's actions are
governed by a standard rather than a rule, no amount of care com-
pletely eliminates the trustee's liability risk. The "hindsight bias" in-
herent in after-the-fact judicial review exacerbates the problem. 196
Even if a course of action is prudent when chosen, it often looks im-
prudent to a decision maker who has information that was not availa-
ble at the time the course of action was taken.19 7 Although the
Restatement (Third) warns against the hindsight bias, 198 the warning
alone may be insufficient to make the bias disappear.
The problem with a regime in which a trustee faces liability that
he or she cannot take reasonable steps to avoid is that trustees gener-
ally will charge higher fees to cover potential liability. This situation
will price some trust settlors (particularly settlors of smaller trusts) out
of the trust market even though there are no efficiency reasons for
depriving those settlors of the power to create a trust. The natural
response by trustees will be to include exculpatory clauses, which re-
lieve the trustee of all responsibility for investment decisions and leave
trust beneficiaries without an effective mechanism to police trustee
investment decisions. 199 Although cases citing the Restatement (Third)
and the UPIA remain small in number, a few of these cases suggest
195 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007) (stating that the trustee must
make "reasonably suitable" investments and implying a reasonable range between con-
servative and aggressive).
196 For a discussion of the hindsight bias in judging, see generallyJeffreyJ. Rachlinski,
A Positive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998).
197 Cf id. at 573-74 (arguing that the hindsight bias could "induce[ ]judges and juries
to hold liable defendants who actually took reasonable care").
198 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. b.
199 For a discussion of the difficulties with excessively broad exculpatory clauses, see
Leslie, supra note 147, at 100-04.
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that exculpatory clauses have become a common approach for deal-
ing with the uncertain liability facing trustees. 200
D. An Alternative: The "Safe Harbor" Approach
How can trust law doctrine improve on the approach to agency
costs reflected in the UPIA and the Restatement (Third)? That is, how
can trust law induce trustees to be more responsive to the investment
objectives of the trust settlor and to the financial needs of the trust
beneficiaries? One answer is to develop a set of rule-like safe harbors
that provide trustees with significantly more guidance than current
law while simultaneously providing incentives for the settlor and the
trustee to discuss and agree on a trust investment strategy at the time
the settlor creates the trust.
If the UPIA and the Restatement (Third) address the agency-cost
problem at all, they do so by enforcing standards for trust investment
behavior rather than by articulating hard-edged rules.20 1 The argu-
ments for eschewing rules in the UPIA and the Restatement (Third)
echo some of the arguments against rules in other areas of law. First,
even if all trusts had identical investment objectives, neither legislators
nor legal scholars know enough about wise investment strategies to
dictate rules to trustees.20 2 Second, trusts do not have identical objec-
tives; in particular, trusts have very different risk tolerances. 20 3 As a
result, a uniform rule to govern all trust investment will generate bad
investment decisions. Furthermore, the diversity of trust objectives
makes it impractical to develop ex ante rules that are optimal for the
circumstances of each individual trust.204
One cannot evaluate the objections to rules, however, without
considering two alternative mechanisms for controlling agency costs:
market-based discipline of trustee investment behavior and the stan-
dard-based approach taken by the UPIA and the Restatement (Third).
Market discipline would require unrealistic assumptions, and the stan-
200 See, e.g., Arns. for the Arts v. Ruth Lilly Charitable Remainder Annuity Trust, 855
N.E.2d 592, 595 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (excusing the trustee from failure to diversify based
on trust language providing that "any investment made or retained by the trustee in good
faith shall be proper despite any resulting risk or lack of diversification or marketability
and although not of a kind considered by law suitable for trust investments" (emphasis
omitted)).
201 See supra note 2.
202 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
579-80 (1992) (discussing costs of rule promulgation); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with
Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 992 (1995) (noting that in many areas people lack the expertise
to create rules that will produce sufficiently accurate results).
203 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e.
204 See Kaplow, supra note 202, at 595 ("[W]hen each instance (no one very likely to
occur) is unique in important ways, substantial ex ante analysis for each conceivable contin-
gency would be a poor investment, whereas ex post determinations under standards are
made with the knowledge that the scenario has indeed arisen.").
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dard-based approach would generate uncertainty for trustees and po-
tentially higher costs for settlors and beneficiaries.20 5 Against that
background, a regime that creates some rule-like safe harbors appears
quite attractive.
Assume for now that all of the tenets of modern portfolio theory
and the ECMH are true; that is, assume that every investment is a suit-
able investment. The drafters of the UPIA and the Restatement (Third)
recognized that even with those assumptions, the trustee must man-
age risk in a manner suitable to the particular trust.20 6 Suppose, how-
ever, that the UPIA and the Restatement (Third) were amended to
include, either in black letter or in a comment, something similar to
the following language: no trustee shall be liable for exposing the
trust or its beneficiaries to excessive market risk if the trustee limits
the trust's investment in equities to 60 percent of the aggregate trust
portfolio.20 7 Adding this language would not expose trustees to addi-
tional liability but instead would create a "safe harbor" for trustees.
Consider the advantages of such an approach. First, the safe har-
bor would provide a blueprint for trustees seeking to avoid liability. 20 8
A trustee who took advantage of the safe harbor would avoid both the
expense of legal advice and the threat of liability that the trustee
would face in a de novo review regime, under which a court would
examine substantively the prudence of the trustee's investment deci-
sions. Because these costs would otherwise be passed on to the trust
settlor or the trust beneficiaries (or both), the safe-harbor approach
would make trusts more affordable than they would be in a regime
that imposed more risk on the trustee.
At the same time, superimposing a safe-harbor provision on a re-
gime that otherwise carefully scrutinizes investment decisions miti-
gates agency costs far better than a regime in which courts defer to
205 See Sunstein, supra note 202, at 976 (discussing planning advantages of rules); see
also Kaplow, supra note 202, at 562-63 ("[S]tandards are more costly for legal advisors to
predict or enforcement authorities to apply because they require later determinations of
the law's content.").
206 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(a) (recommending that the prudent in-
vestment standard not be applied in isolation but should take into account the objectives
of that particular trust).
207 Joel Dobris suggested that, as a matter of practice, trustees might be well-advised
to get a 60/40 portfolio and get some sleep." Dobris, supra note 25, at 504. In a 60/40
portfolio, the 60 percent could be equity or debt depending on how aggressive the investor
chooses to be. Id. Graham earlier suggested that an intelligent investor should never place
less than 25 percent or more than 75 percent of his or her investments in common stocks.
GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 89.
208 Some states have developed rules in related fields designed to provide similar
blueprints. For instance, a Vermont statute governing a guardian's control of the assets of
a minor provides that "not more than 50 percent of the cash resources may be invested in
corporate bonds rated AAA by Moody and in common stocks listed on the New York Stock
Exchange." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2653 (2002).
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trustee decisions. If the primary concern in a regime regulated by
only the market is that trustees will pursue high expected returns even
if the risk associated with those returns is not in the interest of trust
beneficiaries, a safe harbor regime addresses that concern by provid-
ing an incentive to limit equity investments to the amounts encom-
passed in the safe harbor. Because the trustee bears much of the risk
associated with departing from the safe harbor 20 9 and generates only a
small percentage of the benefits, the incentive to use the safe harbor is
strong.
The safe-harbor mechanism need not be restricted to investments
that subject the trust to excess market risk. Another safe harbor might
provide the following: no trustee shall be liable for exposing the trust
or its beneficiaries to excessive inflation risk if the trustee invests at
least 40 percent of the aggregate trust portfolio in equity investments.
Again, the trustee seeking to avoid liability would be well advised to
follow the safe harbor even if no formal rule requires it to do so.
Consider now the principal objections to such a safe-harbor re-
gime (or one like it). One potential objection is that rule makers-
particularly legislators, with the aid of experts and lobbyists-do not
have enough information about optimal investment strategies to craft
sensible rules. Were it not for the inadequacy of market discipline,
the absence of reliable information about investment strategies might
be a plausible argument for deference to the decisions of trustees. It
is not, however, an argument that a standard-based regime would be
preferable to the safe-harbor approach. In a standard-based regime,
legal decision makers will ultimately have to evaluate the prudence of
particular investment strategies. Typically, they will have a little more
information about the prudence of particular strategies after the in-
vestments are made; namely, they will have more information about
investment results, thus generating the potential for hindsight bias-a
problem mitigated by a legal regime that provides trustees with ex ante
safe harbors.
A second objection focuses on the inadequacy of one-size-fits-all
safe harbors to account for the disparate needs and risk tolerances of
trusts set up for a multitude of different purposes. A partial response
to this objection is that if a trustee concludes that safe harbors are
unsuitable for the needs of its trust, the trustee will not be held liable
for losses resulting from a different strategy if the trustee can demon-
strate why the safe-harbor strategy was unsuitable. The response is in-
209 Even if the legal regime formally does not hold a trustee liable for losses resulting
from departures from the safe harbor, the very existence of a safe harbor may, as a practi-
cal matter, impose on a trustee an obligation to explain why the trustee did not use it,
thereby increasing the risk to the trustee who invests more in equities than the amount
specified in the safe harbor.
2010]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
complete, however, because whatever the needs of the trust, the
trustee's incentives will be to use the safe harbor and to avoid the
prospect of liability. A better response is that the trustee can always
protect against liability by ensuring that language in the trust instru-
ment authorizes trust investment practices that differ from those qual-
ifying for safe harbors. Courts should enforce such authorizations so
long as their language is sufficiently definite to put the trust settlor on
notice of the investment strategy the settlor is authorizing. Alterna-
tively, the trustee can protect himself or herself by obtaining consent
from the trust beneficiaries.
To recapitulate, traditional trust doctrine, in an effort to protect
trust beneficiaries against excessive risk taking, ignored agency costs
and thus created an incentive for trustees to ignore the inflation risk
facing trust beneficiaries. 210 The trust law reform movement-em-
bodied in the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA-"solved" this problem
by eliminating all categoric restrictions and by imploring trustees to
consider the risk tolerance of their trusts.211 In doing so, the reform-
ers inadvertently created a new agency-cost problem: they incentivized
trustees to overemphasize potential return even at the cost of exces-
sive risk.212 Two significant bear markets have made the effects of
trust law reform all too concrete for many trust beneficiaries. A rule-
based safe-harbor approach would not have shielded beneficiaries
from all losses and will not prevent future losses, but such an ap-
proach has a greater potential to reduce agency costs than does the
current version of the prudent investor rule.
E. The Contract Alternative: Why Worry About Default Rules?
The analysis so far has assumed that the standard-based prudent
investor rule generates agency costs that a change in trust law doctrine
might reduce. Even so, why would doctrinal change matter? If the
Restatement (Third) and the UPIA generate agency costs, settlors and
trustees will contract around those provisions and into a regime that
maximizes their joint benefit (and derivatively, the benefit of trust
beneficiaries) .213 For the most part, the terms of the trust are subject
to contract, and the provisions impose few constraints on the parties
who seek to individualize the features of the trust relationship they
create.
210 See supra Part I.A.
211 See supra Part I.B-C.
212 See supra Part II.B.
213 See generally Gordon, supra note 22, at 75-76 (discussing the increasing frequency of
trust provisions contracting around the prudent man rule, and noting in particular that
"large trusts are likely to receive sophisticated legal advice and thus will often contract out
of the Rule").
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The contract argument, however, proves too much. If default
rules were indeed irrelevant, there would have been little need to pro-
mulgate the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA because parties could
have contracted around the old prudent man rule. The Restatement
(Third) and the UPIA would not have affected trust practice because
the parties to any trust would have contracted for an individualized,
optimal regime, regardless of the default regime in place. But
Schanzenbach and Sitkoff have demonstrated persuasively that the
change in law did generate a change in trust investment practice;
when states adopted the UPIA, trustees invested a higher percentage
of trust portfolios in equities than before the adoption of the
statute.
2 14
Default rules matter for a number of reasons. 215 First, legal
norms help frame the decisions of affected parties. If parties are con-
fronted with the content of legal norms, they are more likely to hew
closely to those norms than if law provides no guidance. 216 When the
old prudent man doctrine frowned on equities, trustees and benefi-
ciaries did not abandon conservative investments even though con-
tract would have permitted them to do so; similarly, if doctrinal norms
suggested a maximum percentage of equities permitted in trust port-
folios, parties likely would treat that percentage as an indicator of pru-
dent practice.
Second, default rules can redress information asymmetries and
lead to agreements that better reflect the expectations of both parties.
If one party to an agreement is a repeat player who is informed fully
about the legal regime but the other party is not, a default rule that
favors the uninformed party may induce the repeat player to disclose
information he or she would otherwise not disclose.217 Thus, in the
trust context, in which trustees are repeat players, a default rule that
214 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 11; see also Shattuck, supra note 23, at
501-04 (cataloguing the movement of states towards the Massachusetts prudent man rule
in response to the more substantial investment returns available in those states as com-
pared with "legal list" states).
215 Default rules help reduce transaction costs if they give the parties what the parties
would have agreed to if forced to negotiate. See generally John H. Langbein, The Con-
tractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 653-57 (1995) (pointing out that
default fiduciary rules allow settlors and trustees to control agency costs associated with
trust asset management without having to dictate specific fiduciary behavior in advance).
216 Of course, as Melanie Leslie emphasizes, if norms are embodied only in default
rules there is a greater danger of norm erosion than if those rules are mandatory. See
Leslie, supra note 147, at 91-92. But if the default rule provides the trustee with a safe
harbor, the trustee has reason to use the safe harbor rather than contract around it.
217 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice
of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 759-61 (1992); see also Sitkoff, supra note 5, at 643 (arguing
that default trust-governance rules not only serve the protective and cautionary functions
but also ensure that third parties who transact with the trustee can easily ascertain whether
property in the possession of the trustee belongs to the trustee personally, is held in trust,
or is held in some other limited form).
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relieves trustees from liability could lead trustees to withhold informa-
tion about aspects of their behavior that might adversely affect trust
beneficiaries. 218 For that reason, any fiduciary-duty rule is likely to be
preferable to a no-duty regime because it induces trustees to seek ex-
culpatory clauses and increases the likelihood that the trustee will
have to explain the need for such a clause to the beneficiary, thus
reducing information asymmetries.219
A standard-based fiduciary-duty rule, however, makes it easy for a
trustee to paint with a broad brush and explain only that the clause is
necessary to protect the trustee against the litigation risk that arises
from doctrinal uncertainty. By contrast, with a regime of rule-based
safe harbors, the trustee who seeks an exculpatory clause more likely
will have to explain that the default rule would hold the trustee liable
only if the trustee departed from established investment guidelines.
That disclosure, in turn, could lead to a discussion about the merits of
those investment guidelines and the scope of any exculpatory
clause. 220 As a result, even though free contract is possible under the
current standard-based regime, the safe-harbor regime may reduce
the incidence of overbroad exculpatory clauses and increase the pro-
tection available to trust settlors and beneficiaries. 221
F. What If Capital Markets Are Not Efficient?
The preceding subpart identified factors that are likely to lead
trustees to take too much risk even assuming that risk generally corre-
lates with return and that market price reflects a security's long-term
218 Cf Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and Trustee
Identity, 27 C"RDozo L. REv. 2713, 2737 (2006) (arguing that a rule holding trustees strictly
liable for the acts of their agents would encourage trustees to disclose information about
potential delegation issues to the settlor during the negotiation process and seek benefici-
ary approval prior to delegating, whereas a negligence-based liability or a no-liability rule
would exacerbate the information asymmetry).
219 If default rules were designed to duplicate the rules that parties select in actual
agreements, one might conclude that the default rule should exculpate trustees from in-
vestment losses in order to save the parties the transaction costs of including an exculpa-
tory clause. But, here, a default rule imposing liability on trustees serves as an information-
forcing device. By making the rule one of liability, common law forces the trustee to come
forward-at least with language in the trust instrument-and put the settlor (or the set-
tlor's lawyer) on notice of the rule.
220 Although one might expect a settlor's lawyer to protect the settlor's interests in all
cases, trustees prepare some trust instruments, and settlors sign these trust instruments
unrepresented; in other cases, a settlor's lawyer may be concerned about maintaining a
relationship with a trustee who might be a source of future business. See Leslie, supra note
147, at 85-87.
221 Although courts generally enforce exculpatory clauses in trust instruments, courts
typically will construe those clauses strictly. See 3 Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 79, § 222.2.
For instance, a trust document that allows the trustee to "retain" assets that would not be
suitable for trust investments may not be sufficient to overcome the trustee's duty to diver-
sify. See Wood v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 828 N.E.2d 1072, 1074, 1079-80 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
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value. But the subpart also suggests that it would be more effective to
approach those problems by providing trustees with incentives to limit
the percentage of the portfolio invested in equities. Part II, however,
identified problems with two of the basic premises of the trust reform
movement. First, the supposed correlation between risk and reward
does not flow inevitably from any mathematical axiom; depending on
the psychology prevalent among investors at any given time and in any
given place, risky investments may or may not have to promise higher
returns to attract investors. 222 Second, today's market price of a firm's
stock reflects, at least in part, psychological biases of investors that
have little relationship to the firm's long-term value.2 23 Especially for
firms that do not have a significant track record, risks and returns can
be so uncertain that there is little basis for believing that adding the
firm's stock to the trust portfolio will increase the portfolio's expected
return or reduce the portfolio's risk.
The uncertain correlation between risk and reward only strength-
ens the case for encouraging trustees to limit the market risk of trust
portfolios. If increased risk were inevitably correlated with increased
expected return, a prudent trustee always would want to assume as
much market risk as the trust beneficiaries could tolerate. The reason
for limiting the trustee's ability to assume risk would rest entirely on
the trustee's business incentive to sacrifice safety for increased ex-
pected return. But if increased risk does not always correlate with in-
creased expected return either because many investors are risk
neutral or risk preferring or because investors systematically underap-
preciate some kinds of risk, then the reasons for limiting the trustee's
power to assume market risk extend beyond agency-cost reduction.
Attacking the correlation between market price and expected
value presents a serious challenge for the modern theory of trust in-
vesting-a challenge that cannot be met merely by limiting the trust's
investment in equities. If, contrary to the teachings of the ECMH, a
sensible and prudent investor can detect the market imperfections
that lead the market to overvalue particular securities, then those se-
curities do not belong even in a diversified trust portfolio. Similarly, if
the prospects of some start-up firms are so uncertain that their impact
on overall risk and return is impossible to assess, stock of such firms
does not belong in a trust portfolio. 224
If one rejects the strongest forms of the ECMH, the problem is
not merely one of excess market risk. Instead, with respect to some
firms, the firm-specific risk is not worth taking. If the firm's problem
is overvaluation compared to other investments in the trust portfolio,
222 See supra Part H.A.
223 See supra Part II.A.2.
224 See GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 142-43.
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adding the firm's stock to the trust portfolio decreases expected re-
turn compared to other investments that might also diversify the port-
folio. If the problem is uncertainty about the firm's prospects, the
investor has no adequate basis for concluding that the stock will either
increase return or reduce the diversifiable risk of the total portfolio.
Trustees who engage in active management of the trust portfolio
implicitly reject, at least in part, the ECMH.22 5 If they accepted the
strongest form of the ECMH, there would be no reason to try to "beat
the market" through active management. The Restatement (Third) and
the UPIA both authorize active management by trustees.226 The text
of the reform documents does not provide an adequate incentive for
trustees who engage in active management to avoid overvalued invest-
ments and investments where past performance provides too little in-
sight into risk and return. Perhaps, however, courts could construe
the documents to provide such an incentive. The Restatement (Third)
explicitly requires that the prudent investor standard "be applied to
investments not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio
and as a part of an overall investment strategy."227 Because a trustee
who actively manages the trust portfolio rejects the "buy the market"
strategy consistent with the ECMH, 228 the trustee must demonstrate
how each investment in the portfolio contributes to the trustee's over-
all investment strategy. Even derivatives, often condemned for their
speculative nature, can have a place in a trust portfolio if the trustee
demonstrates that the derivates play a role in hedging portfolio
risk.229 If the trustee cannot demonstrate how adding a particular in-
vestment to the portfolio increases expected return or diminishes the
risk of the remainder of the portfolio, then the trustee cannot demon-
225 Cf TALEB, supra note 98, at 62-63 (describing the paradox of a supporter of effi-
cient-markets theory's starting a hedge fund to take advantage of market opportunities).
226 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007) ("The trustee has a duty to the
beneficiaries to invest and manage the funds of the trust as a prudent investor
would ...."); see also UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR AcT § 1 (a) (1994) ("[A] trustee who invests
and manages trust assets owes a duty to the beneficiaries of the trust to comply with the
prudent investor rule . ... ).
227 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(a).
228 See TALEB, supra note 98, at 62 (remarking on the inconsistency of a defender of
efficient-markets theory's founding a hedge fund aimed at taking advantage of market
inefficiencies).
229 See Robert J. Aalberts & Percy S. Poon, Derivatives and the Modem Prudent Investor
Rule: Too Risky or Too Necessary?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 525, 546 (2006) ("[D]erivatives can be
used by fiduciaries to hedge the risk of trust investments because the future price of an
investment can be predetermined in a derivative contract, thereby reducing the uncer-
tainty of the future price of the investment."). Aalberts and Poon note, however, that not
all derivatives are suitable for trust investments. See id. at 556-61 (concluding that forwards
and swaps are not suitable trust investments because they are unregulated, present exces-
sive default risk, raise issues about the duty of loyalty, and involve excessive trading cost).
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strate the prudence of the investment.230 As a result, even if the trus-
tee is not liable for incurring excess market risk (because the trustee
used the "safe harbor" and invested enough in government securities
and high-grade corporate bonds), the trustee may nevertheless incur
liability for taking firm-specific risks without increasing expected re-
turn or decreasing the firm's overall diversifiable risk.
By contrast, even if the ECMH significantly overstates the accu-
racy of market valuation, the trustee who pursues a passive investment
strategy-investing the trust portfolio in mutual funds or other
pooled investments-should generally escape liability for indirect in-
vestments in securities that are undervalued or whose prospects are
entirely uncertain. For many trustees, especially trustees of relatively
small trusts, a passive strategy will be the only available path to ade-
quate diversification of the trust's portfolio. 231 Even with larger trusts,
the cost (including error cost) to investigate each holding in a mutual
fund portfolio to excise inappropriate trust investments may make the
strategy imprudent.232 Investing in mutual funds with mispriced se-
curities will often be superior to the trustee's next-best alternative and
should not subject the trustee to liability so long as the trustee se-
lected the fund with care and also limited the total amount of his or
her investment in equities. The courts should second-guess the trus-
tee's individual investments only when the trustee pursues an active
strategy, which would be prudent only if the trustee invests resources
to investigate individual investments.23 3
G. Delegating Investment Responsibility
Suppose a settlor appoints an individual trustee whose name hap-
pens to be Ezra Merkin. Merkin accepts appointment as trustee, but
because he is less than confident of his own investment prowess, he
turns the trust portfolio over to an individual named Bernard Madoff
to make investment decisions. Madoff has a reputation as an invest-
230 See generally Haskell, supra note 97, at 109 ("It is inadvisable to allow trustees of
family trusts to invest in volatile stocks in a small portfolio.").
231 Cf id. at 110 ("[A] passive strategy of investing in a market fund .. . probably is
safer than the selective diversification of low-risk stocks. In addition, it is likely to produce
a greater return than the selection of stocks.").
232 See Barber et al., supra note 122, at 562 (suggesting that even if savvy investors could
beat the market, transaction costs generally would dissipate the advantages of trying).
233 Graham warned against investors who sought to pursue a "middle ground" between
passive and aggressive investing. GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 175-76. He argued that suc-
cessful pursuit of an active or aggressive investment strategy would require "considerable
knowledge of security values." Id. at 175. For the investor who purports to have the knowl-
edge that makes it plausible to obtain returns in excess of those available to a passive inves-
tor, liability should attach if the investor cannot offer a concrete justification for each
component of a portfolio; the investor who rejects the premise that knowledge will gener-
ate higher returns has a more plausible explanation for holding a fund-particularly an
index fund-that includes some components that appear imprudent.
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ment genius and sends Merkin, as trustee, periodic statements of the
trust's net worth. Years later, Madoff is exposed as the operator of a
Ponzi scheme. Because he already paid out all of the money en-
trusted to him to investors who took their gains early, any remedy the
trust has against Madoff is effectively worthless. As a result, the trust
beneficiaries bring an action against Merkin for breaching his fiduci-
ary duty. May the beneficiaries recover?
Under the common law of trusts, as reflected in the Restatement
(Second), the answer was easy: Merkin improperly delegated his invest-
ment responsibility to Madoff and was liable to the trust beneficiaries
as if he (Merkin) made off with the trust's money.234 The trust reform
movement embodied in the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA reversed
that result by expressly authorizing trustees to delegate investment de-
cisions. 235 That change was suspect when made and makes even less
sense in light of recent history.
1. "Reform" and Its Rationale
As the range of permissible trust investments expanded and as
persistent inflation made trust investment strategies more compli-
cated, the prohibition on paying for investment assistance became
problematic. 236 Trustees became concerned that purchasing mutual
funds-and thus paying for investment assistance with these funds-
would violate the duty not to delegate trust duties. Trustees held this
concern because others might construe fees associated with the mu-
tual fund as "double dipping"-paying two different parties for invest-
ment assistance237-because the trust paid the trustee's fee in
addition to the mutual fund fee but the trustee's fee was supposed to
include compensation for investing the trust portfolio.238 Many juris-
dictions enacted statutes to deal with the mutual-fund problem, 239 but
the issue was broader. Many trustees needed investment advice, and
that advice (like legal advice) was not likely to be available for free.
234 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959).
235 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR AcT § 9(a) (1994) ("A trustee may delegate investment
and management functions that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly
delegate under the circumstances."); RESTATEMENT (THIro) OF TRUSTS § 80(1) (2007) ("A
trustee has a duty to perform the responsibilities of the trusteeship personally, except as a
prudent person of comparable skill might delegate those responsibilities to others.").
236 See generally John H. Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment
Law, 59 Mo. L. REV. 105, 106-10 (1994) (discussing reasons underlying the nondelegation
rule, including the concern about "double dipping").
237 See id. at 108 (describing "double dipping" as a concern that, because "the trustee is
charging for investment services, the trust should not have to pay again to have an outside
investment manager do the job").
238 See id. at 106-10 (explaining the prohibition on "double dipping" as a protection
against overcharging).
239 See, e.g., 760 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5.2 (West 2007) (authorizing investments in
mutual funds).
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Langbein, among others, recognized that the prohibition on
double dipping was a silly way to control a trust's administration ex-
penses.240 Especially as contract law replaced statutory law as the basis
for setting trustee fees, 241 a prohibition on double dipping served lit-
tle purpose; the trustee could obtain the same compensation by in-
creasing fees and paying investment advisors out-of-pocket.242 Thus,
directly addressing any concern about the reasonableness of trustee
fees is better than addressing that concern by prohibiting double
dipping.
In addressing the problem, however, the Restatement (Third) and
the UPIA went beyond authorizing trustees to pay for investment ad-
vice. Instead, they expressly authorized trustees to delegate invest-
ment responsibilities. The trustee no longer was responsible for the
wrongdoing of his or her chosen delegate.243 The trustee could dis-
charge his or her duty and avoid further liability by acting prudently
in selecting the delegate and monitoring the delegate's activity.
2. Analyzing the Delegation Problem
Neither the Restatement (Third), the UPIA, nor the commentary
that accompanied reform of the "no delegation" rule clearly stated the
issue at stake: if a trustee delegates investment duties, who-the trus-
tee or the trust beneficiaries-should bear the loss that results from
240 Langbein, supra note 236, at 108 (criticizing the prohibition on "double dipping"
as a clumsy tool).
241 For instance, in New York, trustee fees generally are governed by section 2309 of
the New York Surrogate's Court Procedure Act. which includes a statutory fee schedule.
See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AcT LAw § 2309 (McKinney 1997). In 1984, however, the New
York legislature enacted section 2312 of that act, which provides:
If the will or lifetime trust instrument makes provisions for specific rates for
amounts of commissions.., for a corporate trustee, or, if a corporate trus-
tee has agreed to accept specific rates or amounts of commissions, a corpo-
rate trustee shall be entitled to be compensated in accordance with such
provisions or agreement, as the case may be.
N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AcT LAw § 2312(1).
242 Indeed, today many legislatures and the Uniform Trust Code even authorize a cor-
porate trustee to invest in the trustee's own proprietary mutual funds, a situation resulting
in double compensation for the trustee. For criticism of these statutes, see Melanie B.
Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor John Langbein, 47 Wm. &
MARY L. Rv. 541, 567-79 (2005).
243 The UPIA provides expressly that "[a] trustee who complies with the requirements
of subsection (a) is not liable to the beneficiaries or to the trust for the decisions or actions
of the agent to whom the function was delegated." UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9(c)
(1994). Subsection (a) requires the exercise of reasonable care in selection of the agent:
"establishing the scope and terms of the delegation" and "periodically reviewing the
agent's actions in order to monitor the agent's performance and compliance with the
terms of the delegation." Id. § 9(a) (2)-(3); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80
cmt. g (2007) (providing that a trustee who delegates a function to an agent and acts with
prudence is not personally liable for decisions by the agent and discussing the trustee's
duty to monitor the agent's performance).
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the delegate's wrongdoing if the delegate proves insolvent or unavaila-
ble? If the delegate is solvent and available, the delegate ultimately
will bear the loss even under the common-law regime; the trustee has
a claim against the delegate for conversion (if the delegate had misap-
propriated trust monies) or for breach of contract (if the delegate
failed to comply with the trustee's investment instructions). Of
course, even a solvent delegate might avoid liability if the trustee
failed to provide the delegate with sufficiently clear instructions,244
but in that case, under either regime, the beneficiaries should not
bear a loss that the trustee easily could have avoided by providing
proper instructions to the delegate.
If the principal risk at issue is the risk of delegate insolvency, the
natural question to start with is which party-the trustee or the trust
beneficiaries-was in a better position to assess and avoid that risk?
The issue is an easy one: the trustee selected the delegate and had the
opportunity to investigate the delegate's background and financial
condition, whereas the beneficiaries had no role in selecting or evalu-
ating the delegate. Basic economic principles suggest placing the risk
on the trustee-the party in the best position to avoid or to spread the
risk.245
By limiting the trustee's liability for actions taken by the chosen
delegate, however, the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA overreacted to
a purported common-law rule that imposed strict liability on a trustee
for all losses suffered by a beneficiary after an improper delegation.
In their influential article, Langbein and Posner seized on language in
Meck v. Behrens,246 a 1927 case suggesting that where an improper del-
egation has occurred, a trustee "becomes a guarantor and is responsi-
ble for any loss that may have resulted, whether or not such loss can
be shown to be the result of the delegation."247 Langbein and Posner
then concluded that, "[a]s applied to trust investments, that theory
would leave the trustee liable for every loss, however reasonable the
investment when made. His breach of the duty of [nondelegation]
would transfer the risk of the market from the trust to the trustee. 248
Langbein and Posner clearly were correct in condemning the broad
principle articulated in Meck. The trustee is supposed to expose the
trust to some degree of market risk, and, if the portfolio selected by
244 Some cases have suggested that if the trustee's delegate knew that the funds were
trust funds and knew that the investments it selected were inappropriate trust investments,
the beneficiaries have a claim against the delegate for aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty. See City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 80
Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 342-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
245 See generally Leslie, supra note 218 (discussing trustee liability).
246 252 P. 91 (Wash. 1927).
247 Id. at 95, quoted in Langbein & Posner, supra note 36, at 19.
248 Langbein & Posner, supra note 36, at 19.
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the delegate was a prudent one, neither the trustee nor the delegate
should be liable for market losses because no wrongful action by ei-
ther party caused the losses to the trust. Furthermore, to hold either
party liable would generate significant agency-cost problems whenever
the trustee delegates investment responsibilities: the beneficiaries
would reap the benefits of investment gains while the trustee would
suffer investment losses. This situation would cause the trustee not to
delegate even though the trust beneficiaries would benefit from the
delegate's supposed investment expertise.
Meck, however, did not involve losses from prudent investments.
In Meck, the trial court found that the trustees had been "careless and
negligent in their duties" and that the carelessness-not market risk
taken by the delegate-caused the beneficiary's loss. 24 9 Moreover, the
cases relied on by Meck involved the core problem posed by delega-
tion: who should bear the risk of insolvency of the trustee's chosen
delegate? In each of those cases, the delegate breached a duty to the
trust, and the court correctly concluded that the trustee, not the bene-
ficiaries, should bear the loss. 250 And in each of those cases, the dele-
gation was a cause of the loss; the trustee, not the beneficiary, chose
the insolvent delegate.251
Langbein and Posner, then, made a persuasive case for absolving-
the trustee from liability for market losses when neither the trustee
249 Meck, 252 P. at 93. In Meck, the complaining beneficiary held a 1/28 interest in a
trust corpus valued at more than two hundred thousand dollars. See id. at 93-94. The trust
property was ready for distribution, except that the trust instrument directed that distribu-
tion be delayed for ten years. See id. at 92. The trustees then entered into a contract with a
trust company for management of the assets, and, ultimately, the trustee distributed less
than six hundred dollars to the beneficiary, leading to the beneficiary's lawsuit. See id. at
93. The trial court, as noted in the text, concluded that the loss resulted from carelessness
and negligence of the trustees. See id.
250 The Meck court relied on four American cases. See id. at 95. In the first of those
cases, McCollister v. Bishop, 80 N.W. 1118 (Minn. 1899), the court ultimately relied on a
statute absolving the assignee of an insolvent corporation from liability for depositing mon-
ies in an authorized depository. See id. at 1119. In the other three cases, where the court
found liability for improper delegation, the delegate breached its obligation to return de-
posited funds to the fiduciary. In each case, the delegate was a bank that became insolvent.
And in each case, the court held that the fiduciary was liable to its beneficiary for the loss
of the deposited funds. See In re Wood's Estate, 114 P. 992, 993-94 (Cal. 1911); Fid. &
Deposit Co. of Md. v. Butler, 60 S.E. 851, 852, 859 (Ga. 1908); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Taggart, 194 S.W. 482, 482-83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
251 See Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Gardiner, 733 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986) ("Generally, a court will not surcharge a trustee if there is no causal connec-
tion between the breach of duty and the loss."), vacated, 733 P.2d 1110 (Ariz. 1987). The
court held, however, that when trustee delegates to a delegate who embezzles, the trustee
is liable because the trustee has offered "no evidence indicating how the loss would have
occurred without her breach of trust." See id.
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nor the delegate takes any wrongful action.252 Their criticism of Meck,
though, does not explain why the beneficiaries should bear the liabil-
ity when the delegate acts wrongfully. Are there countervailing rea-
sons to place the risk of loss on the trust beneficiaries rather than on
the trustee? The limited commentary on the liability issue emphasizes
two incentives the new rule would generate. First, persons without
investment expertise would be more willing to accept appointment as
trustees.253 Second, trustees would become more willing to delegate
investment responsibility to those with greater expertise. 254
Consider first the argument that the "modern" rule embraced by
the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA provides appropriate incentives
for trustees to employ investment advisors with greater expertise.
Freedom from liability for the advisor's wrongdoing is not necessary to
provide that incentive. Even if the trustee who hires an investment
advisor remained liable for the advisor's wrongdoing, the trustee
would still hire the advisor if the trustee believed the advisor's assis-
tance would reduce the trustee's own expected liability. That is,
where the trustee is unsure of his or her own investment prowess and
is fearful to make errors that could cause losses to the trust that sub-
ject him or her to liability, the trustee has personal incentives to seek
advice that reduces that liability. 255 So long as the trustee is free to
pay for the advisor's services out of the proceeds of the trust, the trus-
tee has every reason to hire the advisor.
Moreover, freeing the trustee from liability encourages trustees
who do have investment expertise to delegate investment responsibili-
ties. By delegating, the trustee shifts liability risk to the delegate-
and, in the case of the delegate's insolvency, to the trust benefi-
ciaries-without losing the right to collect commissions. 256 That is,
under the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA, there is every reason for
even a professional trustee to delegate investment responsibility to the
detriment of trust beneficiaries.
Relieving the trustee from liability has another potentially perni-
cious effect: the investment advisor, by inclination and training, may
be less cautious than the trustee and more willing to embrace an in-
vestment strategy that seeks higher returns at higher risks. The invest-
252 Cf Langbein & Posner, supra note 36, at 19 (discussing the unfavorable result
under the duty not to delegate that the trustee's "breach of the duty of nondelegation
would transfer the risk of the market from the trust to the trustee").
253 See generally Langbein, supra note 236, at 110 (discussing reasons for allowing trust-
ees to delegate certain aspects of trust administration).
254 See generally id. (discussing how the nondelegation rule prevented "open discussion
of the standards and safeguards appropriate to delegation").
255 See Leslie, supra note 218, at 2736 ("[I]f the trustee knows it lacks the skills to han-
dle particular investment duties, delegating will be a superior choice to not delegating,
even if the trustee will face liability for the agent's acts.").
256 See id.
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ment advisor is even more likely than the trustee to market his or her
services by emphasizing past returns and to take risks that have the
potential to generate those returns. Moreover, norms within that in-
dustry may differ from norms among lawyers or other professional
trustees and thus may exacerbate the incentives to take an aggressive
approach with trust funds created by the Restatement (Third) and the
UPIA.
The second argument for the "modem" rule that absolves trust-
ees of liability if they prudently delegate trust responsibilities is that
the rule will encourage family members to serve as trustees if they are
reluctant to risk personal liability for imprudent investment decisions.
This argument is, at first glance, more plausible because, by accepting
appointment as trustee, a family member does assume a risk of liabil-
ity he or she otherwise would not bear. Nevertheless, that concern
can be addressed easily in other ways. First, the settlor who anticipates
the problem instead can name a professional trustee and can direct
the professional trustee to abide by the family member's instructions
with respect to distribution decisions-the area in which the settlor
presumably wants the family member's judgment.25 7 Second, the set-
tlor could name co-trustees and provide expressly that the profes-
sional trustee and not the family member has power to make
investment decisions. 258 Third, even if the settlor does not anticipate
the problem, if the family member expresses concern about taking on
trust responsibilities, a court (rather than appointing a substitute trus-
tee) can appoint a co-trustee and can relieve the family member of
investment responsibility. 25 9 In light of these other potential solu-
tions, it is difficult to justify a rule that absolves all trustees from liabil-
ity for delegating investment responsibility on the theory that without
such absolution family members are reluctant to serve. 2 60
257 In effect, the settlor could give the family member a power of appointment over
trust income or corpus. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:. WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 17.1 & cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2006) (discussing the power to
direct a trustee to distribute income or corpus to another party).
258 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81 cmt. b (2007) ("[T]rust provisions may
and often should allocate roles and responsibilities among the trustees, or relieve one or
more of the trustees of duties to participate in particular aspects of the trust's
administration.").
259 Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 34 cmt. e (2003) (authorizing a court to
appoint additional trustees, even when there is no vacancy, when the appointment of addi-
tional trustees would promote better administration of the trust).
260 A more plausible approach would be to authorize explicitly family member trust-
ees, but not professional trustees, to delegate investment decisions. See Leslie, supra note
218, at 2738. As Leslie points out, that approach probably reflects the rule most settlors
would prefer. See id. In addition, family members are less likely to have the background
knowledge to insist on trust language that qualifies the default rule. See id. The principal
disadvantage of such a bifurcation would be a line-drawing problem: should the family
friend or family lawyer (who also happens to be a family friend) be exempt from liability
for delegations that generate losses to the trust?
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Although the justifications advanced for the rule authorizing del-
egation of investment responsibilities were all focused on the family
member-trustee, the rule itself was broader in scope, applying equally
to professional trustees and individual trustees. No persuasive reasons
have been advanced for permitting professional trustees to avoid lia-
bility to trust beneficiaries by the device of delegating investment re-
sponsibility to investment advisors. Yet the Restatement (Third) and the
UPIA sanction that result.
In a stable or rising market, most beneficiaries are unlikely to be
hurt substantially by the Restatement (Third) rule. Actions for impru-
dent investing tend to be less frequent. Fewer investment advisors be-
come insolvent-especially those prudently selected by the trustee. As
a result, the Restatement (Third) rule does little harm. By contrast, in a
falling market, in which investors are losing money and investment
firms that cut corners to generate high returns now find themselves in
serious financial straits, the Restatement (Third) rule does threaten to
harm innocent beneficiaries without generating any obvious social
benefits. The time has come to abandon that rule and replace it with
one that entitles a trustee to seek and to pay for investment advice but
leaves the trustee as a guarantor for any breaches committed by the
investment advisor.
CONCLUSION
The reformers who drafted the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA
took on a serious problem that badly needed a solution. The solution
that they devised relied on and promoted academic theories with im-
peccable pedigrees; the theories generated Nobel Prizes for their pro-
ponents. The solution appeared to promise better returns and less
risk for trust beneficiaries who were the principal victims of the strait-
jacket placed on trustees by traditional trust doctrine. And the solu-
tion-coincidentally or not-appeared to benefit banks and trust
companies by reducing their exposure to liability for imprudent
investments.
Unfortunately, like many of the investments made by trustees
under the new regime, the doctrinal solution proved too good to be
true. The academic theory needs revision, the beneficiaries need ad-
ditional protection, and even the banks may discover that the new re-
gime leaves them exposed to liability. My goal with this Article was to
start the debate about how to construct such a substitute regime.
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